----- Original Message -----
From: "Stephen Paul King" <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>
To: "Jonathan Colvin" <jcolvin.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2005 10:23 PM
Subject: Re: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Dear Jonathan,
A "mental fiction" indeed, but one that we can not just imagine away.
;-)
Stephen
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Jonathan Colvin" <jcolvin.domain.name.hidden>
> To: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
> Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2005 10:19 PM
> Subject: RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
>
>
>>
>>> Stathis: OK then, we agree! It's just that what I (and many others)
>>> refer to as qualia, you refer to as the difference between a
>>> description of a thing and being the thing. I hate the word
>>> "dualism" as much as you do (because of the implication that
>>> we may end up philosophically in the 16th century if we yield
>>> to it), but haven't you just defined a very fundamental kind
>>> of dualism, in aknowledging this difference between a thing
>>> and its description? It seems to me, in retrospect, that our
>>> whole argument has been one over semantics.
>>
>> Well, that would be a novel application of "dualism", I think. A
>> description
>> of a thing, and *a thing* seem to be two very different categories;
>> dualism
>> would usually imply one is talking about dualistic properties of the
>> *same
>> thing*. I'm still inclined to deny that "qualia" refers to anything. It
>> is a mental fiction.
>>
>>
>>>Dennett (whom I
>>> greatly respect) goes to great lengths to avoid having impure
>>> thoughts about something being beyond empirical science or
>>> logic. David Chalmers ("The Conscious Mind", 1996) accepts
>>> that it is actually simpler to admit that consciousness is
>>> just an irreducible part of physical existence. We accept
>>> that quarks, or bitstrings, or whatever are irreducible, so
>>> why is it any different to accept consciousness or
>>> what-it-is-like-to-be-something-as-distinct-from-a-description
>>> -of-something
>>> (which is more of a mouthful) on the same basis?
>>
>>
>> The argument from Dennet (which I'm inclinced to agree with) would be
>> that
>> we can not accept "what-is-it-likeness" as an irreducible thing because
>> there is no such thing as "what is it likeness".
>>
>> Jonathan Colvin
>>
>>>
>>> --Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>> > > [quoting Stathis]
>>> > > > >My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the
>>> > > duplicated
>>> > > > >system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I "became
>>> > > one" with
>>> > > > >the new system by direct neural interface. I don't have to
>>> > > go to such
>>> > > > >lengths to learn about the new system's mass, volume,
>>> > > behaviour, or
>>> > > > >any other property, and in *this* consists the essential
>>> > > difference
>>> > > > >between 1st person and 3rd person experience. You can
>>> > > minimise it and
>>> > > > >say it doesn't really make much practical difference,
>>> but I don't
>>> > > > >think you can deny it.
>>> > > >
>>> > > >I can deny that there is anything special about it, beyond the
>>> > > >difference between A): *a description of an apple*; and B):
>>> > > *an apple*.
>>> > > >I don't think anyone would deny that there is a
>>> difference between
>>> > > >A and B (even with comp there is still a difference); but this
>>> > > "essential
>>> > > >difference" does not seem to have anything in particular
>>> to do with
>>> > > >qualia or experience.
>>> > > >
>>> > > >Jonathan Colvin
>>> > >
>>> > > Stathis: Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever
>>> > > meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing?
>>> >
>>> >My argument (which is Dennet's argument) is that "what it is
>>> like to be
>>> >that thing" is identical to "being that thing". As Bruno
>>> points out, in
>>> >3rd person level (ie. the level where I am describing or
>>> simulating an
>>> >apple), a description can not "be" a thing; but on the 1st
>>> person level
>>> >(where a description *is* the thing, from the point of view of the
>>> >thing, inside the simulation, as it were), then the description does
>>> >"include" what it is like to be that thing. But "include" is not the
>>> >correct word to use, since it subtly assumes a dualism (that
>>> the qualia
>>> >exist somehow separate from the mere description of the thing); the
>>> >description *just is* the thing.
>>> >
>>> >Jonathan
>>> >
>>>
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>>>
>>
>
Received on Thu May 19 2005 - 22:28:15 PDT