> Stathis: OK then, we agree! It's just that what I (and many others)
> refer to as qualia, you refer to as the difference between a
> description of a thing and being the thing. I hate the word
> "dualism" as much as you do (because of the implication that
> we may end up philosophically in the 16th century if we yield
> to it), but haven't you just defined a very fundamental kind
> of dualism, in aknowledging this difference between a thing
> and its description? It seems to me, in retrospect, that our
> whole argument has been one over semantics.
Well, that would be a novel application of "dualism", I think. A description
of a thing, and *a thing* seem to be two very different categories; dualism
would usually imply one is talking about dualistic properties of the *same
thing*. I'm still inclined to deny that "qualia" refers to anything. It is a
mental fiction.
>Dennett (whom I
> greatly respect) goes to great lengths to avoid having impure
> thoughts about something being beyond empirical science or
> logic. David Chalmers ("The Conscious Mind", 1996) accepts
> that it is actually simpler to admit that consciousness is
> just an irreducible part of physical existence. We accept
> that quarks, or bitstrings, or whatever are irreducible, so
> why is it any different to accept consciousness or
> what-it-is-like-to-be-something-as-distinct-from-a-description
> -of-something
> (which is more of a mouthful) on the same basis?
The argument from Dennet (which I'm inclinced to agree with) would be that
we can not accept "what-is-it-likeness" as an irreducible thing because
there is no such thing as "what is it likeness".
Jonathan Colvin
>
> --Stathis Papaioannou
>
> > > [quoting Stathis]
> > > > >My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the
> > > duplicated
> > > > >system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I "became
> > > one" with
> > > > >the new system by direct neural interface. I don't have to
> > > go to such
> > > > >lengths to learn about the new system's mass, volume,
> > > behaviour, or
> > > > >any other property, and in *this* consists the essential
> > > difference
> > > > >between 1st person and 3rd person experience. You can
> > > minimise it and
> > > > >say it doesn't really make much practical difference,
> but I don't
> > > > >think you can deny it.
> > > >
> > > >I can deny that there is anything special about it, beyond the
> > > >difference between A): *a description of an apple*; and B):
> > > *an apple*.
> > > >I don't think anyone would deny that there is a
> difference between
> > > >A and B (even with comp there is still a difference); but this
> > > "essential
> > > >difference" does not seem to have anything in particular
> to do with
> > > >qualia or experience.
> > > >
> > > >Jonathan Colvin
> > >
> > > Stathis: Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever
> > > meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing?
> >
> >My argument (which is Dennet's argument) is that "what it is
> like to be
> >that thing" is identical to "being that thing". As Bruno
> points out, in
> >3rd person level (ie. the level where I am describing or
> simulating an
> >apple), a description can not "be" a thing; but on the 1st
> person level
> >(where a description *is* the thing, from the point of view of the
> >thing, inside the simulation, as it were), then the description does
> >"include" what it is like to be that thing. But "include" is not the
> >correct word to use, since it subtly assumes a dualism (that
> the qualia
> >exist somehow separate from the mere description of the thing); the
> >description *just is* the thing.
> >
> >Jonathan
> >
>
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Received on Thu May 19 2005 - 22:26:48 PDT