2009/9/2 Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>:
>> I wonder what you mean by "either physically realized or in Platonia"?
>> ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation
>> is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is
>> indeed nothing problematic in saying that "two physically different
>> computers perform the same computation". We can understand what is
>> meant without ambiguity; 'different' is indeed different, and any
>> identity is thus non-physical (i.e. relational). But 'realisation' of
>> such relational identity in Platonia in the form of an invariant
>> experiential state is surely something else entirely: i.e. if it is a
>> supplementary hypothesis to PM it is dualism.
>
> Why would a believer in CTM need to make that additional step?
> (You seem to be talkign about the abstract computaitonal state
> having exitence independent from its concrete physcial
> isntantiations).
No, I was querying whether Brent was implying this by his reference to
mental states realised in Platonia but nonetheless deemed to supervene
on physical process. But without such dual supervention, where does
that leave CTM+PM? Either we're appealing to
experience=computation=invariant, or we're appealing to
experience=physical process=variant. If we seek refuge in both, then
in what sense can we maintain an identity? Does invariant=variant?
But if what is meant by this is that physical process is only relevant
to experience *inasmuch as it functionally instantiates a computation*
- i.e. only the non-physical aspects make any difference - then
precisely what remains of experience that is physical? The term Bruno
sometimes uses for any such sense of 'physical' is 'spurious', and I
think that about sums it up.
David
>
>
>
> On 2 Sep, 16:56, David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>> 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker <meeke....domain.name.hidden>:
>>
>> > But the physical implementation (cause?) is invariant in it's functional
>> > relations. That's why two physical implementations which are different
>> > at some lower level can be said to implement the same computation at a
>> > higher level. I see nothing incoherent is saying that two physically
>> > different computers perform the same computation. So if mental states
>> > are certain kinds of computations (either physically realized or in
>> > Platonia) they can be realized on different, i.e. non-invariant physical
>> > processes. What's incoherent about that?
>>
>> I wonder what you mean by "either physically realized or in Platonia"?
>> ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation
>> is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is
>> indeed nothing problematic in saying that "two physically different
>> computers perform the same computation". We can understand what is
>> meant without ambiguity; 'different' is indeed different, and any
>> identity is thus non-physical (i.e. relational). But 'realisation' of
>> such relational identity in Platonia in the form of an invariant
>> experiential state is surely something else entirely: i.e. if it is a
>> supplementary hypothesis to PM it is dualism.
>
> Why would a believer in CTM need to make that additional step?
> (You seem to be talkign about the abstract computaitonal state
> having exitence independent from its concrete physcial
> isntantiations).
>
>> The point of Bruno's
>> argument is to force a choice between the attachment of experience to
>> physical process or computation; but not both at the same time.
>
> I see no problem with mental states attaching to phsycial processes
> "via" the computaitons instantiated by them. AFAICS that is still CTM.
> Since every instance of a computation *is* an instance of a phsycial
> process as well, there is no either/or.
>
> >
>
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Received on Wed Sep 02 2009 - 17:56:53 PDT