Re: Dreaming On

From: Flammarion <>
Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2009 10:01:16 -0700 (PDT)

On 2 Sep, 17:56, David Nyman <> wrote:
> 2009/9/2 Flammarion <>:
> >> I wonder what you mean by "either physically realized or in Platonia"?
> >> ISTM that there is not one assumption here, but two. If computation
> >> is restricted to the sense of physical realisation, then there is
> >> indeed nothing problematic in saying that "two physically different
> >> computers perform the same computation". We can understand what is
> >> meant without ambiguity; 'different' is indeed different, and any
> >> identity is thus non-physical (i.e. relational). But 'realisation' of
> >> such relational identity in Platonia in the form of an invariant
> >> experiential state is surely something else entirely: i.e. if it is a
> >> supplementary hypothesis to PM it is dualism.
> > Why would a believer in CTM need to make that additional step?
> > (You seem to be talkign about the abstract computaitonal state
> > having exitence independent from its concrete physcial
> > isntantiations).
> No, I was querying whether Brent was implying this by his reference to
> mental states realised in Platonia but nonetheless deemed to supervene
> on physical process. But without such dual supervention, where does
> that leave CTM+PM? Either we're appealing to
> experience=computation=invariant, or we're appealing to
> experience=physical process=variant.

Well, I've asked before, but what does (in) variant mean here?

> If we seek refuge in both, then
> in what sense can we maintain an identity? Does invariant=variant?
> But if what is meant by this is that physical process is only relevant
> to experience *inasmuch as it functionally instantiates a computation*
> - i.e. only the non-physical aspects make any difference - then
> precisely what remains of experience that is physical? The term Bruno
> sometimes uses for any such sense of 'physical' is 'spurious', and I
> think that about sums it up.
> David

i suspect you are mixing types and tokens. But I await an answer to
the question
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Received on Wed Sep 02 2009 - 10:01:16 PDT

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