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From: Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Fri, 14 Jan 100 13:20:01 +1100 (EST)

Bruno wrote:

*>
*

*> Suppose you are read and annihilated and then reconstitute at
*

*> 3 different places A B and C.
*

*> So you are uncertain about your 1-person next location.
*

*> The domain of uncertainty is {A, B, C}.
*

*> But suppose the reconstitution failed at C. So, 'you' die at C.
*

*> I say that in that case the domain of uncertainty *was* {A, B}.
*

*> This is what I mean by "you quantify the indeterminacy only where
*

*> you survive.
*

*> So by killing yourself in worlds you don't like, you can manage
*

*> a high probability to find yourself (1-point of view) in worlds
*

*> you like. That is the idea of both comp and quantum suicide.
*

*> And it was the only way I was seeing untill Niclas Thisell propose
*

*> his meditation exercice! Indeed, if you are able, in the preceeding
*

*> setting to transform yourself into a zombie at C, then you will
*

*> also augment the probability to be *conscious* of being at A or B.
*

*>
*

*> Where a zombie is just an unconscious (i.e. there is no 1-person
*

*> view at all) being. It is a technical term in philosophy of
*

*> mind.
*

*>
*

*> Of course Niclas Thisell's solution work because from the
*

*> 1-person point of view, to make oneself zombie is equivalent to
*

*> self-killing.
*

*>
*

*> I just hope your psychic power are based on another method, because
*

*> if you use Thisell technic you could as well be a zombie in
*

*> my branch of the universal computation, and in that case I waste
*

*> my time to convince you :-).
*

*>
*

*> To sum up: if you admit modelising death by terminal kripke worlds,
*

*> then to quantify indeterminism you must cut away those terminal
*

*> worlds, making the accessibility relation ideal.
*

*> Latter I will show you that we will lose the accessibility too. But
*

*> that is suitable because we will get neighborhood and proximity
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*> relations defined on the 2^aleph_0 maximal consistent computational
*

*> continuations. That is suitable for our measure searching.
*

*>
*

*> Bruno
*

*>
*

*>
*

I think I now understand what you're getting at. I'm claiming that I'm

modifying the RSSA transition probabilities between different outcomes

(not the absolute measure - this remains unchanged and irrelevant). If

I were to do this perfectly, i.e. set some of the transition

probabilities to zero, then indeed logically I must be a zombie in

those worlds. However, if we allow the slightest amount of

imperfection in the process (lets say I change the probabilities such

that the undesired outcome has a probability of 10^-googol), then in

practise I'm very unlikely to see a failure, but I would not be a

zombie in the undesired world. In real life, I do not believe I'm

affect probabilities quite that much (maybe a couple of orders of

magnitude at most), so I do see failures in the method, but it works

well enough for me to persist with it.

In short, while at this stage I'm open minded on the possibility of

zombies, I don't believe that any human being, including those called

Russell Standish, has been, are, or ever will be a zombie.

Cheers

PS - the possibility of an imperfect process is exactly enough to save

me from having to prove to you guys that this works by the double

guessing competition I mentioned earlier. So this procedure remains

scientifically uncommunicable, regardless of how good it is :)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dr. Russell Standish Director

High Performance Computing Support Unit,

University of NSW Phone 9385 6967

Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965

Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden

Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Received on Thu Jan 13 2000 - 18:16:41 PST

Date: Fri, 14 Jan 100 13:20:01 +1100 (EST)

Bruno wrote:

I think I now understand what you're getting at. I'm claiming that I'm

modifying the RSSA transition probabilities between different outcomes

(not the absolute measure - this remains unchanged and irrelevant). If

I were to do this perfectly, i.e. set some of the transition

probabilities to zero, then indeed logically I must be a zombie in

those worlds. However, if we allow the slightest amount of

imperfection in the process (lets say I change the probabilities such

that the undesired outcome has a probability of 10^-googol), then in

practise I'm very unlikely to see a failure, but I would not be a

zombie in the undesired world. In real life, I do not believe I'm

affect probabilities quite that much (maybe a couple of orders of

magnitude at most), so I do see failures in the method, but it works

well enough for me to persist with it.

In short, while at this stage I'm open minded on the possibility of

zombies, I don't believe that any human being, including those called

Russell Standish, has been, are, or ever will be a zombie.

Cheers

PS - the possibility of an imperfect process is exactly enough to save

me from having to prove to you guys that this works by the double

guessing competition I mentioned earlier. So this procedure remains

scientifically uncommunicable, regardless of how good it is :)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dr. Russell Standish Director

High Performance Computing Support Unit,

University of NSW Phone 9385 6967

Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965

Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden

Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Received on Thu Jan 13 2000 - 18:16:41 PST

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