Re: The 1 person, the 3 person and the panscient spectator

From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue Dec 21 08:57:42 1999

Russell Standish wrote:

>> BM: It is natural to abstract the
>> terminal worlds for the same reason Niclas Thisell propose to transform
>> yourself into a zombie for diminishing the 3rd mesure. It is the basic
>> idea of the quantum suicide, or the comp suicide: you (relatively)
>> quantify only the quantum (comp) indeterminacy on the worlds where you
>> survive. (in comp: "world" = maximal consistent continuation).
>> It is also equivalent to the "Arithmetical Darwinism" in my thesis.
>>
>>
>
>SR: Sorry - I've lost you completely here.

Suppose you are read and annihilated and then reconstitute at
3 different places A B and C.
So you are uncertain about your 1-person next location.
The domain of uncertainty is {A, B, C}.
But suppose the reconstitution failed at C. So, 'you' die at C.
I say that in that case the domain of uncertainty *was* {A, B}.
This is what I mean by "you quantify the indeterminacy only where
you survive.
So by killing yourself in worlds you don't like, you can manage
a high probability to find yourself (1-point of view) in worlds
you like. That is the idea of both comp and quantum suicide.
And it was the only way I was seeing untill Niclas Thisell propose
his meditation exercice! Indeed, if you are able, in the preceeding
setting to transform yourself into a zombie at C, then you will
also augment the probability to be *conscious* of being at A or B.

Where a zombie is just an unconscious (i.e. there is no 1-person
view at all) being. It is a technical term in philosophy of
mind.

Of course Niclas Thisell's solution work because from the
1-person point of view, to make oneself zombie is equivalent to
self-killing.

I just hope your psychic power are based on another method, because
if you use Thisell technic you could as well be a zombie in
my branch of the universal computation, and in that case I waste
my time to convince you :-).

To sum up: if you admit modelising death by terminal kripke worlds,
then to quantify indeterminism you must cut away those terminal
worlds, making the accessibility relation ideal.
Latter I will show you that we will lose the accessibility too. But
that is suitable because we will get neighborhood and proximity
relations defined on the 2^aleph_0 maximal consistent computational
continuations. That is suitable for our measure searching.

Bruno
Received on Tue Dec 21 1999 - 08:57:42 PST