This whole thread exists only because of one mistake: we should not expect
this moment to be 'followed' by any other. If we persist in thinking that
there is a causal relationship between one time and the next we will
persistently find puzzling paradoxes.
James
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russell Standish [SMTP:R.Standish.domain.name.hidden]
> Sent: Friday, January 14, 2000 2:15 AM
> To: marchal.domain.name.hidden
> Cc: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> Subject: Re: The 1 person, the 3 person and the panscient spectator
>
> Bruno wrote:
>
> >
> > Suppose you are read and annihilated and then reconstitute at
> > 3 different places A B and C.
> > So you are uncertain about your 1-person next location.
> > The domain of uncertainty is {A, B, C}.
> > But suppose the reconstitution failed at C. So, 'you' die at C.
> > I say that in that case the domain of uncertainty *was* {A, B}.
> > This is what I mean by "you quantify the indeterminacy only where
> > you survive.
> > So by killing yourself in worlds you don't like, you can manage
> > a high probability to find yourself (1-point of view) in worlds
> > you like. That is the idea of both comp and quantum suicide.
> > And it was the only way I was seeing untill Niclas Thisell propose
> > his meditation exercice! Indeed, if you are able, in the preceeding
> > setting to transform yourself into a zombie at C, then you will
> > also augment the probability to be *conscious* of being at A or B.
> >
> > Where a zombie is just an unconscious (i.e. there is no 1-person
> > view at all) being. It is a technical term in philosophy of
> > mind.
> >
> > Of course Niclas Thisell's solution work because from the
> > 1-person point of view, to make oneself zombie is equivalent to
> > self-killing.
> >
> > I just hope your psychic power are based on another method, because
> > if you use Thisell technic you could as well be a zombie in
> > my branch of the universal computation, and in that case I waste
> > my time to convince you :-).
> >
> > To sum up: if you admit modelising death by terminal kripke worlds,
> > then to quantify indeterminism you must cut away those terminal
> > worlds, making the accessibility relation ideal.
> > Latter I will show you that we will lose the accessibility too. But
> > that is suitable because we will get neighborhood and proximity
> > relations defined on the 2^aleph_0 maximal consistent computational
> > continuations. That is suitable for our measure searching.
> >
> > Bruno
> >
> >
>
> I think I now understand what you're getting at. I'm claiming that I'm
> modifying the RSSA transition probabilities between different outcomes
> (not the absolute measure - this remains unchanged and irrelevant). If
> I were to do this perfectly, i.e. set some of the transition
> probabilities to zero, then indeed logically I must be a zombie in
> those worlds. However, if we allow the slightest amount of
> imperfection in the process (lets say I change the probabilities such
> that the undesired outcome has a probability of 10^-googol), then in
> practise I'm very unlikely to see a failure, but I would not be a
> zombie in the undesired world. In real life, I do not believe I'm
> affect probabilities quite that much (maybe a couple of orders of
> magnitude at most), so I do see failures in the method, but it works
> well enough for me to persist with it.
>
> In short, while at this stage I'm open minded on the possibility of
> zombies, I don't believe that any human being, including those called
> Russell Standish, has been, are, or ever will be a zombie.
>
> Cheers
>
> PS - the possibility of an imperfect process is exactly enough to save
> me from having to prove to you guys that this works by the double
> guessing competition I mentioned earlier. So this procedure remains
> scientifically uncommunicable, regardless of how good it is :)
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> --
> Dr. Russell Standish Director
> High Performance Computing Support Unit,
> University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
> Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
> Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
> Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> --
Received on Fri Jan 14 2000 - 01:57:49 PST