Here is a collection of paragraphs, coming from last
posts, and bearing around the first and third person perspectives.
I will comment them briefly, and then, I will present you
some of my *formal friends* and I will ask their opinions and
explain you briefly why their *opinions* are relevant.
Jacques Mallah wrote:
>There is no free will; in fact, as I say above, realizing that
>solves the problem. As for "1st person" you will not be surprised that I
>see no basis for such distinctions.
I'm afraid you push the "free-will" problem under the rug. BTW if
you don't distinguish the first and third person point of view I
understand why you stop in the middle of the UDA.
cf
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m537.html and sequel.
Russell Standish wrote (about its "psychic power"):
>I don't think so. I don't believe I ever effected the 3rd person
>probabilities - what I believe I was doing was affecting which branch
>I ended up in. This is why it is a 1st person effect, and is
>unprovable.
If that is true I guess the computationnalist level of substitution
is *very* low. Either we would be sharing some personal quantum
computation or you are really, as Niclas Thisell explained so clearly,
becoming a zombie (which I doubt) and this would still not explain our
witnessing of your "psychokinetic power". And you *do* have a nice family
indeed Russell, but that's hardly a proof of a mediumnic abilities ...
Russell Standish wrote:
>Since we know that we can die in the 3rd person picture, it is clear
>we do not live in an "ideal" model. Why then is it natural to abstract
>away the terminal worlds?
I recall that an ideal frame is a frame (collection of worlds
with an accessibility relation) where there are no terminal worlds.
First we don't *know* that we can die in the 3rd person picture.
It is still an inference made by a first person.
It is natural to abstract the
terminal worlds for the same reason Niclas Thisell propose to transform
yourself into a zombie for diminishing the 3rd mesure. It is the basic
idea of the quantum suicide, or the comp suicide: you (relatively)
quantify only the quantum (comp) indeterminacy on the worlds where you
survive. (in comp: "world" = maximal consistent continuation).
It is also equivalent to the "Arithmetical Darwinism" in my thesis.
Niclas Thisell
>Now, unless the mathematical model explicitly introduces splits and
>mergers, there is no reason to assume that we need to either. The
>scientist may experience first-person splits or wave-function collapses
>during the experiment, but that is, of course, exactly what Everett
>wanted to explain.
I agree. The expression "to experience first-person splits" is
misleading though. Remember the "copernician" proudness of the
quantum many-worlder to explain why we don't feel ourself splitting.
The scientist makes only 3-person statements (even when he invents
or discovers a theory of the first person).
Russell Standish wrote:
>Precisely. This is why 3rd person predictions (which are based on well
>defined probabilities) are of little help in predicting what you will
>actually experience in the 1st person.
I half-agree. Take the self-duplication experiment. You are encoded,
annihilated and reconstituted in both Washington and Moscow. The third
person description is indeed of little help in predicting if your
futur personal feeling will be the Moscow-experience or the
Washington-experience, but it helps in predicting that the experience
will be among {Washington-experience, Moscow-experience}. OK ?
Gisle Tangenes wrote:
>On this analysis, the distinction
>between the 1. and 3. person perspectives is purely epistemic: The
>panscient spectator would have no use for it.
Gosh !
I must say here that I have almost the feeling of hearing my
*formal friends* themselves!
I say "almost" because "purely epistemic" is sometimes used for
"uninteresting", and to say that "the panscient spectator would have
no use for it" could mean "I don't care".
So it is still open if Gisle Tangenes doesn't confuse her/himself
abusively with the panscient spectator itself.
(like Jacques Mallah, I think, a little more below)
Now the distinction between the 1. and 3. person perspective is
indeed purely epistemic, but this does not mean it is not a
fundamental and very interesting distinction. (And this should be
clear for those who have
follow the entire UDA, for they know that the problem of the origin
of the physical laws is a purely epistemic problem, with comp).
Also, I don't know if the panscient spectator has any use of anything,
but I know he knows the distinction is epistemic. From the ontic (= not
epistemic) point of view he knows that the 1 and 3 person are the
same person.
But how do I know that ? It looks like I have some personal
acquaintance with the panscient spectator, isn't it?
Well, believe it or not (at this stage), but, as far as we are
talking about self-referentially correct universal machine, I do:
the panscient spectator (Gisle Tangenes' term) is indeed itself among
my "formal friends".
So I guess it is time I make the presentation.
Alas I have not the time to say a lot ...
I refer you to the archive where I did I first presentation for
Russell. Of course Tangenes'panscient spectator is my "guardian
angel" G*. Look at
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1417.html
G is the modal logical system which proves all the machine is
able to proof about itself in the third person way. So G doesn't
distinguish between a machine and one of its double.
G* is the panscient spectator alias guardian angel, it proves
everything which is true about the machine, including the true
but unprovable, by the machine, propositions.
Exemple: G does not prove -B-T (The machine does not prove its
own consistency). G* proves -B-T (the Guardian Angel proves that
the machine is consistent).
G and G* have a long history : Goedel 1931, Loeb 1955, Solovay 1976.
The first person is obtained by defining a new box C by Cp = p & Bp.
This gives a new logic known as S4Grz. Grz is for Grzegorczyk
(if you can prononce his name you are a first class logician!)
Grzegorczyk is a big polish logician.
Now Cp is provably, by the guardian angel G*, equivalent to Bp, but
not by the machine itself. This makes right Tangenes' remark
that the distinction first/third is epistemic, and don't exist from
the panscient spectator point of view. But it exists for the
machine in both the 1 and 3 point of view.
Note that it can be shown that S4Grz = S4Grz*. That is: from
the first person point of view, provability = truth. This I think
explain Jacques Mallah-like confusion ...
More on that later ...
Have a nice week-end,
Bruno
Received on Fri Dec 17 1999 - 07:49:31 PST