>
>
> Here is a collection of paragraphs, coming from last
> posts, and bearing around the first and third person perspectives.
> I will comment them briefly, and then, I will present you
> some of my *formal friends* and I will ask their opinions and
> explain you briefly why their *opinions* are relevant.
>
>
> Jacques Mallah wrote:
> >There is no free will; in fact, as I say above, realizing that
> >solves the problem. As for "1st person" you will not be surprised that I
> >see no basis for such distinctions.
>
> I'm afraid you push the "free-will" problem under the rug. BTW if
> you don't distinguish the first and third person point of view I
> understand why you stop in the middle of the UDA.
> cf http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m537.html and sequel.
>
>
>
> Russell Standish wrote (about its "psychic power"):
> >I don't think so. I don't believe I ever effected the 3rd person
> >probabilities - what I believe I was doing was affecting which branch
> >I ended up in. This is why it is a 1st person effect, and is
> >unprovable.
>
> If that is true I guess the computationnalist level of substitution
> is *very* low. Either we would be sharing some personal quantum
> computation or you are really, as Niclas Thisell explained so clearly,
> becoming a zombie (which I doubt) and this would still not explain our
> witnessing of your "psychokinetic power". And you *do* have a nice family
> indeed Russell, but that's hardly a proof of a mediumnic abilities ...
>
How do you propose any person can affect 3rd person probabilities? By
definition these probabilities are those given by perfect knowledge -
what a panscient being would observe. In a deterministic world like
the multiverse, all these probabilities are well defined and
computable. No SAS can affect these. SASes can affect probabilities
based on imperfect knowledge, but then I have always called these 1st
person probabilities.
And what exactly do you mean by zombie? According to the dictionary,
as zombie is a person who doesn't possess a soul. Since I don't believe
in souls (at least no one has given me a definition of soul that I can
map onto a meaningful concept), this term is vaccuous. By that
definition, we're all zombies. In this discussion list, the term
zombie seems to refer to someone with vanishingly small measure. If
that is true, then we all become zombies within the first few seconds
of life, as we develop a history. Zombies were discussed a bit before
in this list, however I butted out precisely because it seemed like
inane drivel about a meaningless concept.
Also you are not witnessing my "psychokinetic" power - merely hearing
my word of it. There is no way of proving it - subject to a suggestion
I will make below. As regards my family, you don't know the all the
medical facts. The birth of my son is a minor miracle (knowing the
relevant facts implies an a priori probability of the order 10^{-2},
as opposed to not knowing them, which would imply an a priori value of
say about 75%). However, I won't go into details for personal reasons.
>
>
> Russell Standish wrote:
> >Since we know that we can die in the 3rd person picture, it is clear
> >we do not live in an "ideal" model. Why then is it natural to abstract
> >away the terminal worlds?
>
> I recall that an ideal frame is a frame (collection of worlds
> with an accessibility relation) where there are no terminal worlds.
>
> First we don't *know* that we can die in the 3rd person picture.
> It is still an inference made by a first person.
This sounds like a solipsist statement, and would be attacked by the
usual anti-solipsist arguments.
> It is natural to abstract the
> terminal worlds for the same reason Niclas Thisell propose to transform
> yourself into a zombie for diminishing the 3rd mesure. It is the basic
> idea of the quantum suicide, or the comp suicide: you (relatively)
> quantify only the quantum (comp) indeterminacy on the worlds where you
> survive. (in comp: "world" = maximal consistent continuation).
> It is also equivalent to the "Arithmetical Darwinism" in my thesis.
>
>
Sorry - I've lost you completely here.
>
> Niclas Thisell
> >Now, unless the mathematical model explicitly introduces splits and
> >mergers, there is no reason to assume that we need to either. The
> >scientist may experience first-person splits or wave-function collapses
> >during the experiment, but that is, of course, exactly what Everett
> >wanted to explain.
>
> I agree. The expression "to experience first-person splits" is
> misleading though. Remember the "copernician" proudness of the
> quantum many-worlder to explain why we don't feel ourself splitting.
> The scientist makes only 3-person statements (even when he invents
> or discovers a theory of the first person).
>
>
>
> Russell Standish wrote:
> >Precisely. This is why 3rd person predictions (which are based on well
> >defined probabilities) are of little help in predicting what you will
> >actually experience in the 1st person.
>
> I half-agree. Take the self-duplication experiment. You are encoded,
> annihilated and reconstituted in both Washington and Moscow. The third
> person description is indeed of little help in predicting if your
> futur personal feeling will be the Moscow-experience or the
> Washington-experience, but it helps in predicting that the experience
> will be among {Washington-experience, Moscow-experience}. OK ?
>
OK - yes. I stated the above position a little too extremely.
>
>
> Gisle Tangenes wrote:
> >On this analysis, the distinction
> >between the 1. and 3. person perspectives is purely epistemic: The
> >panscient spectator would have no use for it.
>
> Gosh !
> I must say here that I have almost the feeling of hearing my
> *formal friends* themselves!
>
> I say "almost" because "purely epistemic" is sometimes used for
> "uninteresting", and to say that "the panscient spectator would have
> no use for it" could mean "I don't care".
> So it is still open if Gisle Tangenes doesn't confuse her/himself
> abusively with the panscient spectator itself.
> (like Jacques Mallah, I think, a little more below)
>
> Now the distinction between the 1. and 3. person perspective is
> indeed purely epistemic, but this does not mean it is not a
> fundamental and very interesting distinction. (And this should be
> clear for those who have
> follow the entire UDA, for they know that the problem of the origin
> of the physical laws is a purely epistemic problem, with comp).
>
> Also, I don't know if the panscient spectator has any use of anything,
> but I know he knows the distinction is epistemic. From the ontic (= not
> epistemic) point of view he knows that the 1 and 3 person are the
> same person.
>
> But how do I know that ? It looks like I have some personal
> acquaintance with the panscient spectator, isn't it?
>
> Well, believe it or not (at this stage), but, as far as we are
> talking about self-referentially correct universal machine, I do:
> the panscient spectator (Gisle Tangenes' term) is indeed itself among
> my "formal friends".
>
> So I guess it is time I make the presentation.
>
> Alas I have not the time to say a lot ...
>
> I refer you to the archive where I did I first presentation for
> Russell. Of course Tangenes'panscient spectator is my "guardian
> angel" G*. Look at
>
> http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1417.html
>
> G is the modal logical system which proves all the machine is
> able to proof about itself in the third person way. So G doesn't
> distinguish between a machine and one of its double.
>
> G* is the panscient spectator alias guardian angel, it proves
> everything which is true about the machine, including the true
> but unprovable, by the machine, propositions.
>
> Exemple: G does not prove -B-T (The machine does not prove its
> own consistency). G* proves -B-T (the Guardian Angel proves that
> the machine is consistent).
>
> G and G* have a long history : Goedel 1931, Loeb 1955, Solovay 1976.
>
> The first person is obtained by defining a new box C by Cp = p & Bp.
> This gives a new logic known as S4Grz. Grz is for Grzegorczyk
> (if you can prononce his name you are a first class logician!)
> Grzegorczyk is a big polish logician.
>
> Now Cp is provably, by the guardian angel G*, equivalent to Bp, but
> not by the machine itself. This makes right Tangenes' remark
> that the distinction first/third is epistemic, and don't exist from
> the panscient spectator point of view. But it exists for the
> machine in both the 1 and 3 point of view.
>
> Note that it can be shown that S4Grz = S4Grz*. That is: from
> the first person point of view, provability = truth. This I think
> explain Jacques Mallah-like confusion ...
>
> More on that later ...
>
> Have a nice week-end,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
The thought experinent I had was the following: Suppose Bruno chose a
number, and then communicated that number privately to Jacques. Then I
was to do my triple mumbo-jumbo to ensure I ended up in a world where
Bruno chose 3 (let's say) and sent that number to Jacques. Then it
would appear (if this worked) as though I had some kind of
clairvoyance ability. If it worked, this would really be bizarre,
although in effect it is entangling 2 1st person probabilities, but
not altering any 3rd person probability (Bruno is still randomly
selecting numbers from a certain distribution, and Russell is still
randomly selecting numbers from another distribution). Would Jacques
observe a match?
If not - is this a fair test of the explanation I have been pursuing?
Cheers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Received on Sun Dec 19 1999 - 15:14:18 PST