On 23 Aug 2005, at 18:08, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Hi Bruno,
>
> How is this the case? YD requires that the mind, or some token
> of subjective awareness, can be faithfully represented in terms of TM,
I could agree, despite some ambiguity. (In particular no first person
can *construct* such an association, it is why YD asks for a bet).
> or some other equivalent that can be implemented in a finite number
> of steps in a physically realizable machine.
No. YD does not presuppose the existence of any "physically
realizable machine".
> It is my belief that such TM are equivalent to Boolean algebras
> which have been proven to not be able to faithfully represent any
> QM system having more than 2 dimensions.
OK, but YD asks only that the mind can be implemented in some
(classical or quantum) digital machine. And we know that all digital
machine (classical or quantum) can be runned on a classical (and
immaterial) Turing machine.
> A QM system, or more to the point here, its logical equivalent
> can embed at least one Complete Boolean Algebra. The converse is
> not possible exept for the trivial case.
That is true for embedding which preserves truth values and some
algebraic structure, but not for more general form of embedding. In
any case it is not relevant for the discussion given that YD asks
only for your (classical or quantum) state to be implemented in some
turing machine.
> Unless the Multiverse is restricted to 2 dimensions, how does your
> claim *not* fall apart?
I really don't see why. Are you saying here that, unlike Godfrey, you
think YD is incompatible with even QM without collapse?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Fri Aug 26 2005 - 11:06:21 PDT