Re: subjective reality

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2005 16:53:41 +0200

Sorry for answering late, but I got some hardware problem.


On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, kurtleegod.domain.name.hidden wrote:

> [GK]
> I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM which
> I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus
> Collapse, by the way.
> But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both
> that does it
> (and entanglement, of course!)



This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus
YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD.


> I am afraid I don't understand what you mean by this! Are you
> saying that Everett
> based his interpretation of QM on the premise that YD is true? I
> strongly doubt that...


I do think so. See Deutsch book which make clear that the MWI is
based on comp. But it is explicit in Everett and in Wheeler
assessment. From a strict logical point of view, ad hoc non comp
theory of MWI can be built but it is really out of topic.



> Plus I think much the same can be said about quantum immortality a
> few other Deutschian and Tiplerian notions
> that you take, let us just say, a little too much to the letter.
> The general idea is that one has to be extremely
> careful in the use of conventional terms in the quantum context
> because they may not even be definable...


This is true for all context. Nevertheless "my theory" does not
assume QM. My point is that QM must be derivable from comp in case
comp is true (making comp completely testable). QM is NOT *assumed*
in comp, indeed one of my goal is to explained where the laws of
physics come from, so I should better not presuppose them.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Fri Aug 26 2005 - 10:54:27 PDT

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