Le 18-avr.-05, ā 04:13, printmodel a écrit :
>> Has anyone on the list experienced personal elevations into
>
>> one or more of these parallel universes, I have and would like to
>> exchange info
>
>
>>> mechanically (even allowing infinite resources) generate a world.<
>>
>> JC: Hmmm..but then if such worlds are not effective objects, how
> ...snip...
>> that this is
>> incorrect. Can you show why it is incorrect? Thanks,
>> Norman Samish
>> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
> Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds ("maximal
> consistent set of propositions") of a FS are not computable; that even
> given
> infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to generate a
> "complete" world. This suggests to me that it is *not* the case that
> given
> infinite time, eveything that can happen must happen. I must admit
> this is
> not my area of expertise; but it seems to me that the only other
> option of
> defining a world (identifying it with the FS itself) will, by Godel's
> incompleteness theorem, necessitate that there exist unprovable true
> propositions of world; the world will be incomplete, so again, not
> everything that can happen will happen.
> Bruno?
>
> Jonathan Colvin
I would say that by definition worlds are complete. For example you
could identify
a world with the collection of all true propositions in that world.
Gödel's incompleteness
applies to theories, FS, or machine trying to talk on the world(s).
Everything that can happen *to a machine" does happen *to some machine*
in the
precise sense that the Universal Dovetailer (the "splashed" UTM)
generate all "machine
dreams (computation seen from the 1-pov)". "physical "realities emerge
from coherence
condition related to the mathematical structure of "all computations +
1-pov.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Sun Apr 24 2005 - 07:18:55 PDT