I am not a scientist, just an avid reader of the fascinating ideas presented
in your discussion threads. Although I frequently get lost, particularly
when the math enters into it, I keep on reading everyone's comments and the
links that you frequently provide to more thorough discussions of the topic
at hand. I have learned so much, and been amazed to discover that work is
actually being done on topics that I would only have imaged to be the stuff
of science fiction. I just wanted everyone to know how much I appreciate
reading whatever you have to say; you have all expanded my mind, I thank
you, and I would imagine that there are many more readers like me out there
who remain silent but in awe.
Jeanne
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bruno Marchal" <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
To: "printmodel" <printmodel.domain.name.hidden>
Cc: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: Sunday, April 24, 2005 7:10 AM
Subject: Re: parallel universes
>
> Le 18-avr.-05, ā 04:13, printmodel a écrit :
>
> >> Has anyone on the list experienced personal elevations into
> >
> >> one or more of these parallel universes, I have and would like to
> >> exchange info
> >
> >
> >>> mechanically (even allowing infinite resources) generate a world.<
> >>
> >> JC: Hmmm..but then if such worlds are not effective objects, how
> > ...snip...
> >> that this is
> >> incorrect. Can you show why it is incorrect? Thanks,
> >> Norman Samish
> >> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> >
> > Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds ("maximal
> > consistent set of propositions") of a FS are not computable; that even
> > given
> > infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to generate a
> > "complete" world. This suggests to me that it is *not* the case that
> > given
> > infinite time, eveything that can happen must happen. I must admit
> > this is
> > not my area of expertise; but it seems to me that the only other
> > option of
> > defining a world (identifying it with the FS itself) will, by Godel's
> > incompleteness theorem, necessitate that there exist unprovable true
> > propositions of world; the world will be incomplete, so again, not
> > everything that can happen will happen.
> > Bruno?
> >
> > Jonathan Colvin
>
> I would say that by definition worlds are complete. For example you
> could identify
> a world with the collection of all true propositions in that world.
> Gödel's incompleteness
> applies to theories, FS, or machine trying to talk on the world(s).
> Everything that can happen *to a machine" does happen *to some machine*
> in the
> precise sense that the Universal Dovetailer (the "splashed" UTM)
> generate all "machine
> dreams (computation seen from the 1-pov)". "physical "realities emerge
> from coherence
> condition related to the mathematical structure of "all computations +
> 1-pov.
>
> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
Received on Sun Apr 24 2005 - 12:49:47 PDT