Re: Many worlds theory of immortality

From: Hal Finney <>
Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2005 15:27:25 -0700 (PDT)

Jesse Mazer writes:
> Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single universe
> that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider the
> thought-experiment I suggested in my post at
> --

Generally, I don't think the same logic applies to copying a mind in a
single universe than to splitting of worlds in the MWI. Copying a mind
will double its measure, while splitting one leaves it alone. That is a
significant practical and philosophical difference.

Practically, copying a mind leaves it with half as many resources per
new-mind, while splitting it leaves it with the same number of resources
per mind. This means that you might take very different practical
actions if you knew that your mind was going to be copied than if you
were about to split a coin.

Philosophically, the measure of the observer-moments associated with a
copied mind are twice as great as the measure of the observer-moments
associated with a split one. Obviously 2 is not equal to 1. This puts
the burden of proof on those who would claim that this difference is
philosophically irrelevant in considering issues of consciousness.

Hal Finney
Received on Fri Apr 15 2005 - 19:18:24 PDT

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