I agree with Hal. The measure is doubled after copying. So, this is sort of
the reverse of a suicide experiment in which the measure decreases. If you
consider a doubling in which one of the copies doesn't survive then the
measure stays the same, while in suicide experiment it decreases.
Both the suicide and copying thought experiments have convinced me that the
notion of a conditional probability is fundamentally flawed. It can be
defined under ''normal'' circumstances but it will break down precisely when
considering copying or suicide.
Saibal
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----- Oorspronkelijk bericht -----
Van: ""Hal Finney"" <hal.domain.name.hidden>
Aan: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Verzonden: Saturday, April 16, 2005 12:27 AM
Onderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
> Jesse Mazer writes:
> > Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single
universe
> > that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider
the
> > thought-experiment I suggested in my post at
> > http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html --
>
> Generally, I don't think the same logic applies to copying a mind in a
> single universe than to splitting of worlds in the MWI. Copying a mind
> will double its measure, while splitting one leaves it alone. That is a
> significant practical and philosophical difference.
>
> Practically, copying a mind leaves it with half as many resources per
> new-mind, while splitting it leaves it with the same number of resources
> per mind. This means that you might take very different practical
> actions if you knew that your mind was going to be copied than if you
> were about to split a coin.
>
> Philosophically, the measure of the observer-moments associated with a
> copied mind are twice as great as the measure of the observer-moments
> associated with a split one. Obviously 2 is not equal to 1. This puts
> the burden of proof on those who would claim that this difference is
> philosophically irrelevant in considering issues of consciousness.
>
> Hal Finney
>
Received on Fri Apr 15 2005 - 20:54:21 PDT