Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

From: George Levy <>
Date: Thu, 06 May 2004 23:02:28 -0700

Bruno Marchal wrote:

> I agree with George, but note that I arrive at an equivalent
> assertion without using that "lower levels have lower complexity
> and therefore higher measure". That is possible, but
> the problem is that it is a priori hard to estimate the "dumbness"
> of the universal dovetailer which is quite capable to entangle high
> complexity programs with low complexity programs, so that
> the "multiplication" related to low-complexity can be inherited to
> high-complexity (due to dovetailing). But you may be right, I have not
> proved that "a" UD could be that dumb!

Gosh, Bruno, I don't understand what you are saying. Maybe I am too
naive! Or maybe our background conceptions are too different so even if
the language is the same it does not make sense. For one I don't see how
a first person experience needs to depend on a UD. My view is that the
"observer-experience" simply consists in the (virtual) transitions from
one "observer-moment" to another where the transition is filtered by
having to be consistent with the "observer-state." Note how the observer
bootstraps himself into consciousness out of the plenitude. So maybe my
UD is the "nul UD" : it is the maximally dumb UD.


> From a suggestion of Jacques
> Bailhache (an old everythinger) I have try to build an explicit
> UD which makes the measure on computations arbitrary, but I have
> not succeed, in the limit (on which bears the first points of view),
> the "right measure" seems to self-correct by itself. It is that
> self-measure I study with provability logic.
> Another problem with the idea of "low" level, or of "simple program"
> is that even a program with 2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^64
> as minimal bit-length is quite little in comparison of almost all number
> in Plato Heaven.
> Bruno
> At 15:56 05/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
>> This has been an interesting thread. Unfortunately I was too busy to
>> contribute much. However, here is a thought regarding simulation
>> versus first and third person points of view.
>> It does make sense to talk about a 3rd person point of view about
>> simulation of a conscious entity on a computer. However, I don't
>> think it applies to a first person point of view.
>> In the plenitude we'll have an infinite number of levels of
>> simulation as well as an infinite number of simulations per level
>> (2^aleph_0 as suggested by Bruno in a previous post, or higher)
>> From a first person point of view any observer moment in any
>> simulation and at any level can transit to another observer moment in
>> a different simulation at a different level provided the transition
>> is consistent with the observer. Therefore from the first person
>> point of view there is no such a thing as living in a simulator. As
>> first persons we live in all simulators and at all levels.
>> In addition, since lower levels have lower complexity and therefore
>> higher measure, the number of simulations is higher at lower levels.
>> Therefore we are more likely to occupy ensembles of simulations
>> located at the lower levels. Is there a lowest level in the level
>> hierarchy, that is a level below which there is no simulation, just
>> the plenitude? Possibly. If so, we are most likely to exist "most of
>> the time" at that base level, but we cannot exclude that "some of the
>> time" we may be in a higher level.
>> hmmmm. This argument points to the fact that "most of the time" we do
>> not live in a simulator!
>> George
Received on Fri May 07 2004 - 02:06:10 PDT

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