I agree with George, but note that I arrive at an equivalent
assertion without using that "lower levels have lower complexity
and therefore higher measure". That is possible, but
the problem is that it is a priori hard to estimate the "dumbness"
of the universal dovetailer which is quite capable to entangle high
complexity programs with low complexity programs, so that
the "multiplication" related to low-complexity can be inherited to
high-complexity (due to dovetailing). But you may be right, I have not
proved that "a" UD could be that dumb! From a suggestion of Jacques
Bailhache (an old everythinger) I have try to build an explicit
UD which makes the measure on computations arbitrary, but I have
not succeed, in the limit (on which bears the first points of view),
the "right measure" seems to self-correct by itself. It is that
self-measure I study with provability logic.
Another problem with the idea of "low" level, or of "simple program"
is that even a program with 2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^64
as minimal bit-length is quite little in comparison of almost all number
in Plato Heaven.
Bruno
At 15:56 05/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
>This has been an interesting thread. Unfortunately I was too busy to
>contribute much. However, here is a thought regarding simulation versus
>first and third person points of view.
>
>It does make sense to talk about a 3rd person point of view about
>simulation of a conscious entity on a computer. However, I don't think it
>applies to a first person point of view.
>
>In the plenitude we'll have an infinite number of levels of simulation as
>well as an infinite number of simulations per level (2^aleph_0 as
>suggested by Bruno in a previous post, or higher)
>
> From a first person point of view any observer moment in any simulation
> and at any level can transit to another observer moment in a different
> simulation at a different level provided the transition is consistent
> with the observer. Therefore from the first person point of view there is
> no such a thing as living in a simulator. As first persons we live in all
> simulators and at all levels.
>
>In addition, since lower levels have lower complexity and therefore higher
>measure, the number of simulations is higher at lower levels.
>
>Therefore we are more likely to occupy ensembles of simulations located at
>the lower levels. Is there a lowest level in the level hierarchy, that is
>a level below which there is no simulation, just the plenitude? Possibly.
>If so, we are most likely to exist "most of the time" at that base level,
>but we cannot exclude that "some of the time" we may be in a higher level.
>
>hmmmm. This argument points to the fact that "most of the time" we do not
>live in a simulator!
>
>George
>
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Received on Thu May 06 2004 - 06:13:19 PDT