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From: Stephen Paul King <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Thu, 6 May 2004 16:39:13 -0400

Daer Bruno and George,

At the risk of being massively naive, does this idea seem to be related

to the infamous problem of Boltzmann's Stosszahlansatz?

http://www.lns.cornell.edu/spr/1999-02/msg0014388.html

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001244/01/Winsberg_laws_and__statmech.doc

My reasoning is that in order to figure out how do define a universal

prior (or probability measure for the initiona conditions that led

inevitably to our common world of experience) we need to understand how to

define a ration of worlds like ours to all possible worlds, or the

computational equivalent: algorithms that generate worlds like ours as a

subset of the collection of all possible algorithms.

Kindest regards,

Stephen

----- Original Message -----

From: "Bruno Marchal" <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

To: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>

Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2004 6:14 AM

Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

*> I agree with George, but note that I arrive at an equivalent
*

*> assertion without using that "lower levels have lower complexity
*

*> and therefore higher measure". That is possible, but
*

*> the problem is that it is a priori hard to estimate the "dumbness"
*

*> of the universal dovetailer which is quite capable to entangle high
*

*> complexity programs with low complexity programs, so that
*

*> the "multiplication" related to low-complexity can be inherited to
*

*> high-complexity (due to dovetailing). But you may be right, I have not
*

*> proved that "a" UD could be that dumb! From a suggestion of Jacques
*

*> Bailhache (an old everythinger) I have try to build an explicit
*

*> UD which makes the measure on computations arbitrary, but I have
*

*> not succeed, in the limit (on which bears the first points of view),
*

*> the "right measure" seems to self-correct by itself. It is that
*

*> self-measure I study with provability logic.
*

*> Another problem with the idea of "low" level, or of "simple program"
*

*> is that even a program with 2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^64
*

*> as minimal bit-length is quite little in comparison of almost all number
*

*> in Plato Heaven.
*

*>
*

*> Bruno
*

*>
*

*> At 15:56 05/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
*

*> >This has been an interesting thread. Unfortunately I was too busy to
*

*> >contribute much. However, here is a thought regarding simulation versus
*

*> >first and third person points of view.
*

*> >
*

*> >It does make sense to talk about a 3rd person point of view about
*

*> >simulation of a conscious entity on a computer. However, I don't think it
*

*> >applies to a first person point of view.
*

*> >
*

*> >In the plenitude we'll have an infinite number of levels of simulation as
*

*> >well as an infinite number of simulations per level (2^aleph_0 as
*

*> >suggested by Bruno in a previous post, or higher)
*

*> >
*

*> > From a first person point of view any observer moment in any simulation
*

*> > and at any level can transit to another observer moment in a different
*

*> > simulation at a different level provided the transition is consistent
*

*> > with the observer. Therefore from the first person point of view there
*

is

*> > no such a thing as living in a simulator. As first persons we live in
*

all

*> > simulators and at all levels.
*

*> >
*

*> >In addition, since lower levels have lower complexity and therefore
*

higher

*> >measure, the number of simulations is higher at lower levels.
*

*> >
*

*> >Therefore we are more likely to occupy ensembles of simulations located
*

at

*> >the lower levels. Is there a lowest level in the level hierarchy, that is
*

*> >a level below which there is no simulation, just the plenitude? Possibly.
*

*> >If so, we are most likely to exist "most of the time" at that base level,
*

*> >but we cannot exclude that "some of the time" we may be in a higher
*

level.

*> >
*

*> >hmmmm. This argument points to the fact that "most of the time" we do not
*

*> >live in a simulator!
*

*> >
*

*> >George
*

*> >
*

*>
*

*> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
*

*>
*

*>
*

Received on Thu May 06 2004 - 17:04:39 PDT

Date: Thu, 6 May 2004 16:39:13 -0400

Daer Bruno and George,

At the risk of being massively naive, does this idea seem to be related

to the infamous problem of Boltzmann's Stosszahlansatz?

http://www.lns.cornell.edu/spr/1999-02/msg0014388.html

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001244/01/Winsberg_laws_and__statmech.doc

My reasoning is that in order to figure out how do define a universal

prior (or probability measure for the initiona conditions that led

inevitably to our common world of experience) we need to understand how to

define a ration of worlds like ours to all possible worlds, or the

computational equivalent: algorithms that generate worlds like ours as a

subset of the collection of all possible algorithms.

Kindest regards,

Stephen

----- Original Message -----

From: "Bruno Marchal" <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

To: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>

Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2004 6:14 AM

Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

is

all

higher

at

level.

Received on Thu May 06 2004 - 17:04:39 PDT

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