Daer Bruno and George,
At the risk of being massively naive, does this idea seem to be related
to the infamous problem of Boltzmann's Stosszahlansatz?
http://www.lns.cornell.edu/spr/1999-02/msg0014388.html
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00001244/01/Winsberg_laws_and__statmech.doc
My reasoning is that in order to figure out how do define a universal
prior (or probability measure for the initiona conditions that led
inevitably to our common world of experience) we need to understand how to
define a ration of worlds like ours to all possible worlds, or the
computational equivalent: algorithms that generate worlds like ours as a
subset of the collection of all possible algorithms.
Kindest regards,
Stephen
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bruno Marchal" <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
To: <everything-list.domain.name.hidden>
Sent: Thursday, May 06, 2004 6:14 AM
Subject: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?
> I agree with George, but note that I arrive at an equivalent
> assertion without using that "lower levels have lower complexity
> and therefore higher measure". That is possible, but
> the problem is that it is a priori hard to estimate the "dumbness"
> of the universal dovetailer which is quite capable to entangle high
> complexity programs with low complexity programs, so that
> the "multiplication" related to low-complexity can be inherited to
> high-complexity (due to dovetailing). But you may be right, I have not
> proved that "a" UD could be that dumb! From a suggestion of Jacques
> Bailhache (an old everythinger) I have try to build an explicit
> UD which makes the measure on computations arbitrary, but I have
> not succeed, in the limit (on which bears the first points of view),
> the "right measure" seems to self-correct by itself. It is that
> self-measure I study with provability logic.
> Another problem with the idea of "low" level, or of "simple program"
> is that even a program with 2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^2^64
> as minimal bit-length is quite little in comparison of almost all number
> in Plato Heaven.
>
> Bruno
>
> At 15:56 05/05/04 -0700, George Levy wrote:
> >This has been an interesting thread. Unfortunately I was too busy to
> >contribute much. However, here is a thought regarding simulation versus
> >first and third person points of view.
> >
> >It does make sense to talk about a 3rd person point of view about
> >simulation of a conscious entity on a computer. However, I don't think it
> >applies to a first person point of view.
> >
> >In the plenitude we'll have an infinite number of levels of simulation as
> >well as an infinite number of simulations per level (2^aleph_0 as
> >suggested by Bruno in a previous post, or higher)
> >
> > From a first person point of view any observer moment in any simulation
> > and at any level can transit to another observer moment in a different
> > simulation at a different level provided the transition is consistent
> > with the observer. Therefore from the first person point of view there
is
> > no such a thing as living in a simulator. As first persons we live in
all
> > simulators and at all levels.
> >
> >In addition, since lower levels have lower complexity and therefore
higher
> >measure, the number of simulations is higher at lower levels.
> >
> >Therefore we are more likely to occupy ensembles of simulations located
at
> >the lower levels. Is there a lowest level in the level hierarchy, that is
> >a level below which there is no simulation, just the plenitude? Possibly.
> >If so, we are most likely to exist "most of the time" at that base level,
> >but we cannot exclude that "some of the time" we may be in a higher
level.
> >
> >hmmmm. This argument points to the fact that "most of the time" we do not
> >live in a simulator!
> >
> >George
> >
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
Received on Thu May 06 2004 - 17:04:39 PDT