Re: The Anthropic Principle Boundary Conditions

From: Jacques Mallah <>
Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2000 16:34:54 -0700 (PDT)

--- wrote:
> writes:
> > I don't know what you mean by subjective. If by
> > "subjective" you mean "pertaining to a particular
> > observer-moment", than an observer-moment would
> > qualify. But keep in mind that other observer-
> > moments exist, that they are just as real, and
> > that the ratio of numbers of different types of
> > such is a feature of the objective reality.
> You are expounding here the concept of objective
> reality, almost as if your "other observer-moments"
> could exist independently of observers.

    Depends what you mean by "observers".

> First the name itself "observer-moment" presupposes
> the concept of time. It implies a infinitesimally
> thin slice of space-time with dt-> 0. (i.e.,
> moment). I find it difficult to believe that such an
> entity could be the "atom" of cognition. I rather
> work out with a slice in logical space than a
> slice in space-time. By slice in logical space, I
> mean a slice involving a single elementary logical
> process.

    As I've said, I identify an observer-moment with a
step in a computation. That does qualify as an
elementary logical process. For a fixed mapping, a
step does happen instantly, but there are finite
intervals between steps.

> I agree 100% with you that "no possible observation
> would falsify the AUH." If we make a wabbity
> observation there are three ways to go:

> 2) Declare that this observation has no cause. This
> is the Copenhagen school. It denies the possibility
> that the world could have a completely rational
> basis. In the absence of rationality, falsifiability
> becomes a moot point.

    I don't think that's the same as the Copenhagen
"school", but it may be one of their schools.
Copenhagen makes about as much sense as QTI, which is
why I can't say I understand either view.

> 3) Declare that the observation is symmetrical with
> its opposite in a completely inaccessible world.
> This approach would conserve symmetry and
> rationality but is not falsifiable on theoretical
> grounds. Somehow the MWI does not seem to fall under
> this case. Even though those other worlds are
> "inaccessible" we do get experimental evidence that
> they exist and we do use those worlds (as in quantum
> computing for example). Something is missing. How
> can we be aware of and affected by worlds which are
> inaccessible?

    There are interference effects, indicating that
they are part of the same mathematical structure.
They don't just evolve in parrallell, they co-evolve.

> I believe that the missing link has to do with the
> ability of consciousness to span several of the MWs.
> I.e., consciousness has "thickness" across worlds?
> Is there a relationship between this "thickness" and
> Planck's constant? I don't know enough about physics
> to pursue this line of reasonning.

    Go with the latter sentence.
> > Computationalism asserts that such a
> > brain is conscious, but other schools of thought
> > would make a distinction such that, for example, a
> > zombie brain would still make the same deductions
> > as a conscious brain.
> This confusion originates from the fact that the
> perception of consciousness is relativistic and tied
> to the frame of reference of the observer. From my
> perspective, the zombie/non-zombie paradox is a red
> herring. Computationalism + Relativity would breeze
> through this problem.

    I don't know what you're trying to say, but as I
said, with computationalism the problem does not

- - - - - - -
               Jacques Mallah (
         Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
         My URL:

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Received on Wed Jun 07 2000 - 16:38:12 PDT

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