Re: The Anthropic Principle Boundary Conditions

From: <>
Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2000 19:03:53 EDT

In a message dated 06/07/2000 4:38:27 PM Pacific Daylight Time, writes:

> -- wrote:
> > First the name itself "observer-moment" presupposes
> > the concept of time. It implies a infinitesimally
> > thin slice of space-time with dt-> 0. (i.e.,
> > moment). I find it difficult to believe that such an
> > entity could be the "atom" of cognition. I rather
> > work out with a slice in logical space than a
> > slice in space-time. By slice in logical space, I
> > mean a slice involving a single elementary logical
> > process.
> As I've said, I identify an observer-moment with a
> step in a computation. That does qualify as an
> elementary logical process. For a fixed mapping, a
> step does happen instantly, but there are finite
> intervals between steps.

Great, we agree on this count.

> > I agree 100% with you that "no possible observation
> > would falsify the AUH." If we make a wabbity
> > observation there are three ways to go:
> > 3) Declare that the observation is symmetrical with
> > its opposite in a completely inaccessible world.
> > This approach would conserve symmetry and
> > rationality but is not falsifiable on theoretical
> > grounds. Somehow the MWI does not seem to fall under
> > this case. Even though those other worlds are
> > "inaccessible" we do get experimental evidence that
> > they exist and we do use those worlds (as in quantum
> > computing for example). Something is missing. How
> > can we be aware of and affected by worlds which are
> > inaccessible?
> There are interference effects, indicating that
> they are part of the same mathematical structure.
> They don't just evolve in parrallell, they co-evolve.

Easy said but hard to justify. For "interference" to occur there must be a
(linear) summation process with the inputs being each of those worlds and the
output being made available to our senses. How is this summation done? What
is the summation device? Why do we perceive the sum and not the components?
You say, the worlds just "add up" as complex numbers. Why is that so?

> > I believe that the missing link has to do with the
> > ability of consciousness to span several of the MWs.
> > I.e., consciousness has "thickness" across worlds?
> > Is there a relationship between this "thickness" and
> > Planck's constant? I don't know enough about physics
> > to pursue this line of reasonning.
> Go with the latter sentence.

You are too glib. It's not that simple. If we lived in only one of the worlds
we would not see the (summation) interference. Yet we see it. The question is
"in how many worlds do we live and how is Planck's constant related to this

> > > Computationalism asserts that such a
> > > brain is conscious, but other schools of thought
> > > would make a distinction such that, for example, a
> > > zombie brain would still make the same deductions
> > > as a conscious brain.
> >
> > This confusion originates from the fact that the
> > perception of consciousness is relativistic and tied
> > to the frame of reference of the observer. From my
> > perspective, the zombie/non-zombie paradox is a red
> > herring. Computationalism + Relativity would breeze
> > through this problem.
> I don't know what you're trying to say, but as I
> said, with computationalism the problem does not
> arise.

You don't have a problem because the phenomenon of consciousness does not get
in your way. By itself pure 3rd person computationalism (your version) could
explain the behavior of a machine, a computer, a zombie, or a person. I agree
with you that you could have measures and so on. However, it is only a third
person perspective and does not explain the first person phenomenon of

Received on Thu Jun 08 2000 - 16:13:21 PDT

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