Jacques Mallah wrote:
>
> --- Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > Jacques Mallah wrote:
> > >At any rate, you shouldn't consider here observers
> > >who can't use the internet because this list
> filters
> > >them out.
> >
> > Maybe, although this does come down to exactly how
> > the Anthropic Principle is supposed to work. Does
> > one require a PhD as a minimum to understand the AP,
> > hence this filters out anyone under 20 or so??
>
> No, the AP isn't rocket science.
Hence the conundrum. I posed the question sometime back about whether
a dog's consiousness suffices. I don't believe this question has been
satisfactorily resolved. If a baby's consciousness suffices for the
AP, then this spells big problems for your argument against QTI. If
however, the being an adult human being is required, then you escape
the problem. However, your argument would predict that I would remain
forever youthful (I should be so happy!).
>
> > > > The idea of "observer moment" initially
> > > > presupposes that the moment has no temporal
> > > > duration - it is instantaneous. The problem with
> > > > this, is that there is no time whatsoever in
> > > > which the observer can experience its moment.
> > Computationalism requires time in order to compute
> > the observation. No time, no computation.
>
> Well, an implementation (as it has so far been
> defined) requires a system with the form of an initial
> value problem, hence with a time, to implement it.
> But the state transitions implemented by a system with
> continuous time are instantaneous. There is no
> problem there.
Here, you are losing me. What do implementations and state transitions
have to do with the topic of conversation?
>
> > > > (Incidently, there are two converse assertions
> > > > making up computationalism. That Turing
> > > > computability is necessary and sufficient for
> > > > consciousness.
> > >
> > > That's not what computationalism says.
> > > Computationalism says that certain computations,
> > >if implemented, give rise to consciousness. It
> does
> > >not say that computability is necessary. A
> physical
> > > system that lacks computability can still
> implement
> > > computations. It is certainly not sufficient
> > >since not all computations are conscious.
> >
> > Huh? In my books, the property of computability
> > means being able to perform computations. The
> > property of emulability means that a UTM can compute
> > a given object. Perhaps I'm employing terms in a
> > different way to other people, in which case I'd be
> > happy to be enlightened.
>
> As I've seen it, 'computability' is more like what
> you call 'emulability'. For example, some functions
> are computable, while others (like Kolmogorov
> complexity) aren't.
Well, let's find a term we can agree on to describe the property of
being able to emulate a UTM. Since you object to "computability", its
your turn to come up with a suggestion.
>
> > If a computation can be conscious, then any
> > Universal Turing Machine can perform the
> > computation, and be conscious. Therefore, you are
> > saying computability is sufficient for
> > consciousness.
>
> It would still need to run one of the right
> programs.
>
Irrelevant!
> > I understood that conputationalism also required
> that
> > computability be necessary for consciousness, ie
> > that any conscious entity can emulate a UTM.
>
> Absolutely not. For example, the human brain has
> a finite memory, so it can't emulate a UTM.
>
All you need to do is supply an infinite tape to the human being, and
it does quite a nice job of it. In fact an arbitrary large (but finite
but arbitrarily large tape suffices, because the human being will die
on you before it gets to consume an infinite amount of
tape). Nevertheless, it is emulating the the UTM perfectly up to the
point of death.
> > > I don't see your point. The observer doesn't
> > > implement a computation; the physical system does.
> >
> > What physical system? I thought you were asserting
> > that an observer moments are all that exist,
> > unconnected with each other.
>
> You must be confusing me with someone else,
> probably JH. I have always asserted that some type of
> underlying system (mathematical or physical) exists
> and implements the computations. Observer-moments are
> all that exists in the way of consciousness/conscious
> observers, but other stuff besides consiousness
> exists.
>
But obviously not observable. Funny sort of existence.
> > > For a fixed mapping, it transitions between formal
> > > states at some instant. Thus, for a fixed
> > > mapping, there are a finite number of formal clock
> > > steps per unit physical time, and the transitions
> > > are instantaneous but it dwells for some period in
> > > the formal states. What's the problem?
> >
> > Again, what time? I thought you were in denial about
> > time!
>
> Again, you were confused. On the contrary, I have
> often defended the view that time is real.
>
> > > > In a quantum history view of the world, the lack
> > > >of extremely aged observations does not
> contradict
> > > >QTI (Jacques' argument).
> > >
> > > Why not? While I'm not quite sure what you
> > > mean by a "quantum history", I am quite sure your
> > > statement is false.
> >
> > I have explained to you before about what a quantum
> > history is.
>
> No, you haven't. You have made some cryptic
> statements about it, and I keep asking for
> clarification.
>
> > Your argument (against QTI) only works
> > when the sampling of observer moments is
> > independent. When there is a history involved, the
> > sampling is most definitely not independent. I am
> > the age I am because I have a history of sampling
> > 30+ years worth of observer moments. In twenty
> > years time I can amend that statement to 50+ years.
>
> I don't know what you think you are trying to say,
> but you aren't making much sense. If by 'you' you
> mean your current observer-moment, you have no
> history. If by 'you' you mean some set of
> observer-moments with certain characteristics, you
> still have to consider the effective probability of
> various ages for the observer-moments *within* that set.
>
You are still sampling independently. This is simply not the case.
> =====
> - - - - - - -
> Jacques Mallah (jackmallah.domain.name.hidden)
> Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
> "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
> My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/
>
> __________________________________________________
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>
>
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Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Received on Tue May 16 2000 - 20:10:43 PDT