--- Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> Jacques Mallah wrote:
> >At any rate, you shouldn't consider here observers
> >who can't use the internet because this list
filters
> >them out.
>
> Maybe, although this does come down to exactly how
> the Anthropic Principle is supposed to work. Does
> one require a PhD as a minimum to understand the AP,
> hence this filters out anyone under 20 or so??
No, the AP isn't rocket science.
> > > The idea of "observer moment" initially
> > > presupposes that the moment has no temporal
> > > duration - it is instantaneous. The problem with
> > > this, is that there is no time whatsoever in
> > > which the observer can experience its moment.
> Computationalism requires time in order to compute
> the observation. No time, no computation.
Well, an implementation (as it has so far been
defined) requires a system with the form of an initial
value problem, hence with a time, to implement it.
But the state transitions implemented by a system with
continuous time are instantaneous. There is no
problem there.
> > > (Incidently, there are two converse assertions
> > > making up computationalism. That Turing
> > > computability is necessary and sufficient for
> > > consciousness.
> >
> > That's not what computationalism says.
> > Computationalism says that certain computations,
> >if implemented, give rise to consciousness. It
does
> >not say that computability is necessary. A
physical
> > system that lacks computability can still
implement
> > computations. It is certainly not sufficient
> >since not all computations are conscious.
>
> Huh? In my books, the property of computability
> means being able to perform computations. The
> property of emulability means that a UTM can compute
> a given object. Perhaps I'm employing terms in a
> different way to other people, in which case I'd be
> happy to be enlightened.
As I've seen it, 'computability' is more like what
you call 'emulability'. For example, some functions
are computable, while others (like Kolmogorov
complexity) aren't.
> If a computation can be conscious, then any
> Universal Turing Machine can perform the
> computation, and be conscious. Therefore, you are
> saying computability is sufficient for
> consciousness.
It would still need to run one of the right
programs.
> I understood that conputationalism also required
that
> computability be necessary for consciousness, ie
> that any conscious entity can emulate a UTM.
Absolutely not. For example, the human brain has
a finite memory, so it can't emulate a UTM.
> > I don't see your point. The observer doesn't
> > implement a computation; the physical system does.
>
> What physical system? I thought you were asserting
> that an observer moments are all that exist,
> unconnected with each other.
You must be confusing me with someone else,
probably JH. I have always asserted that some type of
underlying system (mathematical or physical) exists
and implements the computations. Observer-moments are
all that exists in the way of consciousness/conscious
observers, but other stuff besides consiousness
exists.
> > For a fixed mapping, it transitions between formal
> > states at some instant. Thus, for a fixed
> > mapping, there are a finite number of formal clock
> > steps per unit physical time, and the transitions
> > are instantaneous but it dwells for some period in
> > the formal states. What's the problem?
>
> Again, what time? I thought you were in denial about
> time!
Again, you were confused. On the contrary, I have
often defended the view that time is real.
> > > In a quantum history view of the world, the lack
> > >of extremely aged observations does not
contradict
> > >QTI (Jacques' argument).
> >
> > Why not? While I'm not quite sure what you
> > mean by a "quantum history", I am quite sure your
> > statement is false.
>
> I have explained to you before about what a quantum
> history is.
No, you haven't. You have made some cryptic
statements about it, and I keep asking for
clarification.
> Your argument (against QTI) only works
> when the sampling of observer moments is
> independent. When there is a history involved, the
> sampling is most definitely not independent. I am
> the age I am because I have a history of sampling
> 30+ years worth of observer moments. In twenty
> years time I can amend that statement to 50+ years.
I don't know what you think you are trying to say,
but you aren't making much sense. If by 'you' you
mean your current observer-moment, you have no
history. If by 'you' you mean some set of
observer-moments with certain characteristics, you
still have to consider the effective probability of
various ages for the observer-moments *within* that set.
=====
- - - - - - -
Jacques Mallah (jackmallah.domain.name.hidden)
Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL:
http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/
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Received on Tue May 16 2000 - 10:39:31 PDT