Jacques, you are a dualist too! You maintain that there is some substrate
which generates the OMs. What is the basis for this assertion?
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jacques Mallah [SMTP:jackmallah.domain.name.hidden]
> Sent: Tuesday, 16 May, 2000 6:36 PM
> To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> Subject: Re: History-less observer moments
>
> --- Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > Jacques Mallah wrote:
> > >At any rate, you shouldn't consider here observers
> > >who can't use the internet because this list
> filters
> > >them out.
> >
> > Maybe, although this does come down to exactly how
> > the Anthropic Principle is supposed to work. Does
> > one require a PhD as a minimum to understand the AP,
> > hence this filters out anyone under 20 or so??
>
> No, the AP isn't rocket science.
>
> > > > The idea of "observer moment" initially
> > > > presupposes that the moment has no temporal
> > > > duration - it is instantaneous. The problem with
> > > > this, is that there is no time whatsoever in
> > > > which the observer can experience its moment.
> > Computationalism requires time in order to compute
> > the observation. No time, no computation.
>
> Well, an implementation (as it has so far been
> defined) requires a system with the form of an initial
> value problem, hence with a time, to implement it.
> But the state transitions implemented by a system with
> continuous time are instantaneous. There is no
> problem there.
>
> > > > (Incidently, there are two converse assertions
> > > > making up computationalism. That Turing
> > > > computability is necessary and sufficient for
> > > > consciousness.
> > >
> > > That's not what computationalism says.
> > > Computationalism says that certain computations,
> > >if implemented, give rise to consciousness. It
> does
> > >not say that computability is necessary. A
> physical
> > > system that lacks computability can still
> implement
> > > computations. It is certainly not sufficient
> > >since not all computations are conscious.
> >
> > Huh? In my books, the property of computability
> > means being able to perform computations. The
> > property of emulability means that a UTM can compute
> > a given object. Perhaps I'm employing terms in a
> > different way to other people, in which case I'd be
> > happy to be enlightened.
>
> As I've seen it, 'computability' is more like what
> you call 'emulability'. For example, some functions
> are computable, while others (like Kolmogorov
> complexity) aren't.
>
> > If a computation can be conscious, then any
> > Universal Turing Machine can perform the
> > computation, and be conscious. Therefore, you are
> > saying computability is sufficient for
> > consciousness.
>
> It would still need to run one of the right
> programs.
>
> > I understood that conputationalism also required
> that
> > computability be necessary for consciousness, ie
> > that any conscious entity can emulate a UTM.
>
> Absolutely not. For example, the human brain has
> a finite memory, so it can't emulate a UTM.
>
> > > I don't see your point. The observer doesn't
> > > implement a computation; the physical system does.
> >
> > What physical system? I thought you were asserting
> > that an observer moments are all that exist,
> > unconnected with each other.
>
> You must be confusing me with someone else,
> probably JH. I have always asserted that some type of
> underlying system (mathematical or physical) exists
> and implements the computations. Observer-moments are
> all that exists in the way of consciousness/conscious
> observers, but other stuff besides consiousness
> exists.
>
> > > For a fixed mapping, it transitions between formal
> > > states at some instant. Thus, for a fixed
> > > mapping, there are a finite number of formal clock
> > > steps per unit physical time, and the transitions
> > > are instantaneous but it dwells for some period in
> > > the formal states. What's the problem?
> >
> > Again, what time? I thought you were in denial about
> > time!
>
> Again, you were confused. On the contrary, I have
> often defended the view that time is real.
>
> > > > In a quantum history view of the world, the lack
> > > >of extremely aged observations does not
> contradict
> > > >QTI (Jacques' argument).
> > >
> > > Why not? While I'm not quite sure what you
> > > mean by a "quantum history", I am quite sure your
> > > statement is false.
> >
> > I have explained to you before about what a quantum
> > history is.
>
> No, you haven't. You have made some cryptic
> statements about it, and I keep asking for
> clarification.
>
> > Your argument (against QTI) only works
> > when the sampling of observer moments is
> > independent. When there is a history involved, the
> > sampling is most definitely not independent. I am
> > the age I am because I have a history of sampling
> > 30+ years worth of observer moments. In twenty
> > years time I can amend that statement to 50+ years.
>
> I don't know what you think you are trying to say,
> but you aren't making much sense. If by 'you' you
> mean your current observer-moment, you have no
> history. If by 'you' you mean some set of
> observer-moments with certain characteristics, you
> still have to consider the effective probability of
> various ages for the observer-moments *within* that set.
>
> =====
> - - - - - - -
> Jacques Mallah (jackmallah.domain.name.hidden)
> Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
> "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
> My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/
>
> __________________________________________________
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Received on Wed May 17 2000 - 00:47:02 PDT