David Nyman wrote:
> On 1 Sep, 17:09, Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
>
>>> If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with
>>> it the notion of a virtual ontology. This is so clear cut that I
>>> would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept
>>> it or refute it with precise counter-argument. Which is it to be?
>>>
>> You have slipped into Bruno's habit of confusing CTM with comp.
>>
>> comp=CTM+Platonism.
>>
>
> I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive,
> but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM
> postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain,
> and hence in principle implementable by any physical process capable
> of instantiating the equivalent computation. Bruno's 'version' starts
> with this postulate and then shows that the first part of the
> hypothesis - i.e. that the mind is computational - is incompatible
> with the second part - i.e. that it is implemented by some
> specifically distinguishable non-computational process.
That's the step I don't grasp. I see that the MGA makes it plausible
that the mind could be a computation divorced from all physical
processes - but not that it must be. Maybe you can explain it.
Brent
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Received on Tue Sep 01 2009 - 16:14:09 PDT