2009/9/2 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>:
>> I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive,
>> but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM
>> postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain,
>> and hence in principle implementable by any physical process capable
>> of instantiating the equivalent computation. Bruno's 'version' starts
>> with this postulate and then shows that the first part of the
>> hypothesis - i.e. that the mind is computational - is incompatible
>> with the second part - i.e. that it is implemented by some
>> specifically distinguishable non-computational process.
>
> That's the step I don't grasp. I see that the MGA makes it plausible
> that the mind could be a computation divorced from all physical
> processes - but not that it must be. Maybe you can explain it.
I was just re-reading some of this thread (sad, isn't it?) and I just
wanted to check the difference of interpretation implied in what you
said above. As you say, MGA argues that there could be a valid
realisation of a putatively 'experiential computation' that involved
no physical processing. It then argues that such an absence of
physical processing would in fact mean that associating any experience
with such a 'stopped system' is grossly implausible on materialist
assumptions. The escape from this impasse it offers, short of
abandoning CTM, is consequently that if mind is still to be considered
a computation, it now *must* be divorced from all physical processing,
and hence from the assumption of PM. The force of the 'must' comes
from the contradiction otherwise unavoidable in invoking physical
processing as simultaneously both necessary and irrelevant to
experience.
Sorry if this was already obvious, I just wanted to check for
clarification. Does your involvement of the wider environment beyond
the narrowly defined computational realisation change the force of the
MGA argument as described above, and if so how?
David
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> On 01 Sep, 17:09, Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>> If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with
>>>> it the notion of a virtual ontology. This is so clear cut that I
>>>> would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept
>>>> it or refute it with precise counter-argument. Which is it to be?
>>>>
>>> You have slipped into Bruno's habit of confusing CTM with comp.
>>>
>>> comp=CTM+Platonism.
>>>
>>
>> I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive,
>> but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM
>> postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain,
>> and hence in principle implementable by any physical process capable
>> of instantiating the equivalent computation. Bruno's 'version' starts
>> with this postulate and then shows that the first part of the
>> hypothesis - i.e. that the mind is computational - is incompatible
>> with the second part - i.e. that it is implemented by some
>> specifically distinguishable non-computational process.
>
> That's the step I don't grasp. I see that the MGA makes it plausible
> that the mind could be a computation divorced from all physical
> processes - but not that it must be. Maybe you can explain it.
>
> Brent
>
> >
>
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Mon Sep 14 2009 - 13:45:05 PDT