On 1 Sep, 17:09, Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with
> > it the notion of a virtual ontology. This is so clear cut that I
> > would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept
> > it or refute it with precise counter-argument. Which is it to be?
>
> You have slipped into Bruno's habit of confusing CTM with comp.
>
> comp=CTM+Platonism.
I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive,
but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM
postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain,
and hence in principle implementable by any physical process capable
of instantiating the equivalent computation. Bruno's 'version' starts
with this postulate and then shows that the first part of the
hypothesis - i.e. that the mind is computational - is incompatible
with the second part - i.e. that it is implemented by some
specifically distinguishable non-computational process. If this point
is not established, we can go no further. But the proof does not
depend either on platonism or the UD argument, purely on a reductio ad
absurdum that takes the standard assumptions of 'CTM+PM' as its
premises. And it follows directly from the incompatibility of these
premises that computation per se cannot be comprehended as
'supervening' on anything other than its own purely arithmetical
specification (i.e. essentially on itself).
What this shows is that CTM and comp are not different, but rather
that comp is CTM properly understood. Its 'supervention' on
virtualisation - i.e. a bottomless stack as perceived from inside -
means that demanding that it further supervene on distinguishable
'platonic entities' is equivalent to demanding that it further
supervene on PM, and hence equally superfluous. That is, you can
believe it if you like but it is inconsequential. I realise that
these conclusions are surprising (they certainly surprise me) and that
of course they are not what most believers (and it is a belief) in CTM
assume; but that does not mitigate their force.
What is consequent on all of this is that prior acceptance of CTM
nullifies the force of your sceptical argument, because in making the
assumption you have perforce abandoned scepticism with regard to its
necessary consequences. If you like, belief in CTM is belief in the
ghost in the machine, and ghosts and machines don't interact. You may
regain your more general scepticism at the cost of relinquishing the
assumption of CTM.
David
>
> If I reject Platonism, I can keep
> CTM and still reject the virtualsiation claim as lacking likelihood.
> Having done that. I should believe I am running on the metal as that
> is the simplest ontology.
> On 1 Sep, 16:32, David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> > On 1 Sep, 15:32, Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> > > There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
> > > wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
> > > If there is nothing at the bottom
> > > of the stack, there are no virtualisations running higher up.
>
> > Yes, it sounds logically compelling when you put it like that, doesn't
> > it? But the entailment of CTM - and this is why it's so important for
> > you to clarify your objections to this - is that there is nothing that
> > can be said about "the bottom of the stack" that is not vacuous with
> > respect to computational theory.
>
> That just amounts to saying that you can't prove with
> certainty that you are not beign virtualised. I have
> taken that on board all along. I can still say with
> high probability that I am not virtualised. The point
> you and Bruno keep missing is that there is no
> priam facie evidence of any UD or stack. I do not
> have to argue myself "out" of it., just note that
> there is no evidence I am in it. in the first place.
>
> All my argument requires is
>
> 1) Occam's razor
> 2) the observation that there are infintiely many sceptical hypotheses
> 3) the observation that there is no evidence for any of them.
>
> i do *not* need specific evidence that I am not being virtualised,
> just 1)..3)
>
> > CTM forces us to face the issue of
> > the incompatibility of what we think we want out of an ontology, and
> > what we can actually get on the basis of a given theory. CTM forces
> > you - by Occam - to disregard any effects of a non-virtual ontology.
>
> No it doesn't. Without the assumption of Platonism there is
> no reason to believe in a UD or other virtualisation device
> exists in the first place. I can't be certain I am not virtualised,
> but it is unlikely. So I can continue beleiving in a materist ontology
> as the likelisest option.
>
> > Beyond this, there's nothing to stop you making an additional claim
> > that it must nonetheless supervene on 'real matter' in order to be
> > really real. But in that case, after the application of the razor,
> > it's you who are invoking pixies.
>
> If it's not resting on matter, it's restign on numbers, and why
> shouildn't the razor apply to them?
>
> > If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with
> > it the notion of a virtual ontology. This is so clear cut that I
> > would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept
> > it or refute it with precise counter-argument. Which is it to be?
>
> You have slipped into Bruno's habit of confusing CTM with comp.
>
> comp=CTM+Platonism.
>
> If I reject Platonism, I can keep
> CTM and still reject the virtualsiation claim as lacking likelihood.
> Having done that. I should believe I am running on the metal as that
> is the simplest ontology.
>
> > > > Consequently under CTM, one is committed to RITSIAR=virtual, not
> > > > RITSIAR=platonic.
>
> > > CTM only suggests that I *could* be virtualised. Alternatively
> > > I could be running on the metal. I do wish you guys would undertand
> > > that
> > > Possible X => actually X
> > > is a fallacy.
>
> > CTM does not only suggest this, it forces the conclusion, or else
> > collapses. Saying no to the doctor implies either that you distrust
> > his command of theory or praxis, or alternatively that you don't
> > believe in CTM - this is still your option.
>
> Yes doctor doesn't mean I actually am virtualised, only
> that I can't tell *for sure* that I am not. However I can stil
> be 99% sure I am not. The vanishingly small possibility
> that I am wrong should not affect my jugements -- unlike Occam's
> razor.
>
> >This is such a crucial
> > point that at this stage ISTM that it requires either clear acceptance
> > on the basis of truth, or clear refutation on the basis of error.
> > AFAICS these discussions are absolutely pointless on any other basis.
> > > > Now, one obviously has the option *precisely in
> > > > virtue of this* to dismiss CTM as itself vacuous. But this is the
> > > > value of the insight: its force is to commit you to these explicit
> > > > choices, and hence to cease vacillating between incompatible
> > > > theoretical conjunctions.
>
> > > No incompatibility has been demonstrated.
>
> > Well, I and others have argued at some length that it has, and Bruno
> > in particular has argued with great precision that it has. The floor
> > is yours.
>
> Bruno argues with immense detail *from* his Platonist premise,
> but he barely defends the premise itself.
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Received on Tue Sep 01 2009 - 10:35:49 PDT