Re: AUH/MWI/UDA (Was: Everything is Just a Memory)

From: Alastair Malcolm <>
Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2000 13:47:47 -0000

----- Original Message -----
From: Marchal <>

> How could MWI dominates AUH ? How could "Everett worlds" dominate "All
> worlds"?

(Remembering the context of only-SAS-worlds, and Everett as the only
consistent MWI:)
Presumably there is some bit-string+interpretation that specifies the most
SAS's for a given minimum functional length. If this string+interpretation
is equivalent to MWI, then we are likely to be in the universe described by
it, and under these circumstances MWI will dominate the AUH, that is, the
measure for all SAS's will be dominated by those inhabiting MWI-worlds. (The
only other remotely reasonable possibility (but intuitively less likely) is
that there are several disparate theories specifying a comparable number of
SAS's per minimum information unit, and we happen to be in the MWI one.)

> Do you agree that a priori Comp, "All computation" dominates
> Everett-worlds,
> and that this fact is the roots of the possible apparition of a White
> Rabbit?
> (accepting decoherence explains the absence or the rarity of quantum WR).

I think there are too many vaguaries/unknowns (for example, whether QM is
quantised in all departments) for me to try for a useful succinct answer to
the first part of this question.

> There are two white rabbit problem.
> Why no WR in my past. This I think is soluble with comp through Uinversal
> Prior, ASSA, Russell's and your's Occam (see also Higgo's WASP, ...)
> Why no WR in my futures: this should be explained by RSSA, ...(cf UDA).

Only 1 WR problem (and seemingly solvable) in my/Tegmark's (bird-based)
framework. I am still trying to grapple with the framework you have been
presenting! (See below.)

> I simplify myself for clarity. It all depends on the level of
> substitution.
> If the level is very low we could have that
> COMP implies the existence of two moons around the earth.
> Now, apparently there is only one moon; so comp is false.
> That the level is so low is hardly plausible.

Please forgive a few more very basic (and probably very stupid) questions,
as I try to understand this:

I have presumed that by low-level substitution you have been meaning digital
substitution at around the atomic or molecular level, and by high level
around the neural level (so a neuron is replaced by a complex algorithm,
say). If that is a correct presumption, then why is low level substitution
implausible? I would have thought that high level simulation of physics is
*less* likely to be accurate, in general.

Also, I presume from your statement about deriving the logic of physical
propositions from the UDA, that you mean *our* physics (rather than a
spectrum of possible physical laws)? Is this physics derivation based on
SAS-measures from the plenitude (of the UD), or something else, or is it
entirely linked to deriving physical continuations *given* a SAS
(/psychologically capable machine)?


Received on Sat Feb 05 2000 - 05:57:48 PST

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