Re: AUH/MWI/UDA (Was: Everything is Just a Memory)

From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed Feb 2 11:01:53 2000

Alastair Malcolm wrote:

>I'll rephrase that question if I may (I'm sure my explanatory powers are
>independent of the veracity of QM!):
>Do I agree that if AUH > MWI, then either (I) QM is false, or (II) MWI is
>derivable from AUH as providing the highest SAS-measure?

Yes.


>Let's assume for simplicity that Everett's is the only consistent MWI, and
>consider only SAS-containing worlds. Then I agree to the extent that either
>MWI dominates the AUH (case (II) and my (c)) (in which case MWI should be
>derivable (in principle) from AUH as the most prolific SAS-creator per
>information unit), or MWI does not dominate the AUH, in which case QM is
>much less likely to apply to our universe (unless there is some sufficiently
>simple single-universe QM theory) - close to cases (I) and (b).

How could MWI dominates AUH ? How could "Everett worlds" dominate "All
worlds"?

Do you agree that a priori Comp, "All computation" dominates
Everett-worlds,
and that this fact is the roots of the possible apparition of a White
Rabbit?
(accepting decoherence explains the absence or the rarity of quantum WR).

>I agree that if AUH = MWI (which I don't accept), or MWI dominates AUH, then
>the essential WR problem is solvable. But all the above is predicated on the
>contention that simple universes are more numerous than complex ones.
>Do you accept the arguments given for this contention (given in my web site,
>Russell's Ockham paper, and earlier posts of ours)?

Same question. But also ...

There are two white rabbit problem.
Why no WR in my past. This I think is soluble with comp through Uinversal
Prior, ASSA, Russell's and your's Occam (see also Higgo's WASP, ...)
Why no WR in my futures: this should be explained by RSSA, ...(cf UDA).

>> Of course here we are vague. With comp we are warned: the day we give
>> a name to our favorite plenitude: BAM! Wellcome the many-plenitudes
>> theory.
>
>Then we have to go back to underlying principles to find the overarching
>plenitude.

Sorry. I should have said: <<the day we give a definite name to our
favorite
plenitude: BAM! ...>> where "definite name" means a complete theory.
There is no BAM! in arithmetical and computer science theories thanks
to the necessary incompleteness of all theories here. (Underlying
principles
are given Church Thesis and the number theoretical propositions: the set
of such
true propositions is not axiomatisable).

>> My problem with your (and others) type of everything approach is that you
>> seem to take the "worlds" for an intuitively clear notion. But even with
>> Everett MWI, I am not sure that this is clear enough.
>
>I mainly find intuitive definitions sufficient for worlds, but agree that
>there are occasions when one must be more careful/explicit.

OK. More on this point latter.

>One thing I don't understand about this (its nice to have it all together,
>by the way) is in point 14: how is comp refuted for a physics deviating from
>traditional empirical physics (would comp be refuted if we found ourselves
>in a classical-physics universe; or an ordinary (QM) universe + a WR event?)

I simplify myself for clarity. It all depends on the level of
substitution.
If the level is very low we could have that

COMP implies the existence of two moons around the earth.

Now, apparently there is only one moon; so comp is false.

That the level is so low is hardly plausible. So to make clear an answer
to
your question we should try to put some separation between geographical
laws
and physical laws. geographical laws = contingent observable truth.
Physical
laws = necessary observable truth.

To be in a classical universe ? A comp fanatic could still pretends that
the
digitalisation level is very very low (electron obeys classical laws, but
the subsubsubsub...quark would interfere).

... and of course it is open if Planck Constant is geographical or
physical.

Now if comp entails just the logical shape of QM (all constant would be
geographical (which I doubt!)) then empirical QM would be a confirmation
of comp.

I will stop here.

Bruno
Received on Wed Feb 02 2000 - 11:01:53 PST