Re: Emulation and Stuff

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2009 12:47:24 +0200

Rex, I have seen your post and I will take the time needed to answer
it cautiously.

Quentin, your post is simpler to answer, so I do it no, but then I
have to do some works.

On 14 Aug 2009, at 12:16, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

> 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <>:
>> On 14 Aug 2009, at 03:18, David Nyman wrote:
>>> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <>:
>>>> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
>>>> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models
>>> And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model -
>>> but
>>> you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
>>> bricks.
>> You are right, with comp. Stuffy bricks cannot be emulated by turing
>> machine, except perhaps by quantum one, but that has to be justified
>> from number and logic alone.
> Well, as a quantum computer can be simulated by a classical one (a
> quantum computer can't compute what a classical computer can't)... it
> will just be order of magnitude slower for the classical computer. So
> I don't understand the 'perhaps by quantum one'.

Because stuffy bricks, with comp, have to been recovered from the
physics extracted from comp, infinite statistics on infinite
computations) and this one predict some amount of indeterminacy which
is or is not covered by quantum computations. This is an open problem
(*the* open problem, partially solved by the 4th and 5th AUDA-

>>> Stuff and consciousness -
>>> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into
>>> this.
>>> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
>>> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions
>>> till
>>> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will
>>> play
>>> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
>>> things. As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
>>> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
>>> reality to be settled empirically.
>> With comp, reality is definitely not Turing emulable. If we
>> discover a
>> computable theory of reality, then we will know that we cannot say
>> yes
>> to the doctor, we will have to abandon the comp hyp.
> I don't understand this either, if reality is computable, obviously
> our consciousness is too.

You are right. Reality is turing emulable ====> our consciousness is
Turing emulable (obvious).
But we have: our consciousness is Turing emulable ===> physical
reality is NOT a priori Turing emulable (by UDA-7-8)

 From this it follows that: Reality is turing emulable ====> Reality
is NOT turing emulable.

This entails that: Reality is NOT turing emulable. With or without comp.

The prospect that reality is described by a quantum computation is not
yet ruled out, because the non computable part of reality could still
be only the first person indeterminacy. The non computable feature
would be the "geographic" one, like finding oneself in Washington
instead of Moscow after a self-duplication experiment.



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Received on Fri Aug 14 2009 - 12:47:24 PDT

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