Re: Emulation and Stuff

From: Quentin Anciaux <allcolor.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2009 12:16:27 +0200

2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>:
>
>
> On 14 Aug 2009, at 03:18, David Nyman wrote:
>
>>
>> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>:
>>> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
>>> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models
>>
>> And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model - but
>> you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
>> bricks.
>
> You are right, with comp. Stuffy bricks cannot be emulated by turing
> machine, except perhaps by quantum one, but that has to be justified
> from number and logic alone.
>

Well, as a quantum computer can be simulated by a classical one (a
quantum computer can't compute what a classical computer can't)... it
will just be order of magnitude slower for the classical computer. So
I don't understand the 'perhaps by quantum one'.


>
>> Stuff and consciousness -
>> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into this.
>> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
>> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions till
>> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will play
>> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
>> things.  As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
>> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
>> reality to be settled empirically.
>
> With comp, reality is definitely not Turing emulable. If we discover a
> computable theory of reality, then we will know that we cannot say yes
> to the doctor, we will have to abandon the comp hyp.

I don't understand this either, if reality is computable, obviously
our consciousness is too.

Regards,
Quentin


> Bruno
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>



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Received on Fri Aug 14 2009 - 12:16:27 PDT

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