2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>:
>
> Rex, I have seen your post and I will take the time needed to answer
> it cautiously.
>
> Quentin, your post is simpler to answer, so I do it no, but then I
> have to do some works.
>
>
> On 14 Aug 2009, at 12:16, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>>
>> 2009/8/14 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 14 Aug 2009, at 03:18, David Nyman wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> 2009/8/14 Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>:
>>>>> A sufficiently detailed, accurate and
>>>>> predictive numerical model is as good as the stuff it models
>>>>
>>>> And in terms of stuffy ontology, it would be a successful model -
>>>> but
>>>> you wouldn't expect to be able to build a house out of emulated
>>>> bricks.
>>>
>>> You are right, with comp. Stuffy bricks cannot be emulated by turing
>>> machine, except perhaps by quantum one, but that has to be justified
>>> from number and logic alone.
>>>
>>
>> Well, as a quantum computer can be simulated by a classical one (a
>> quantum computer can't compute what a classical computer can't)... it
>> will just be order of magnitude slower for the classical computer. So
>> I don't understand the 'perhaps by quantum one'.
>http://cpc.cx/lP
>
> Because stuffy bricks, with comp, have to been recovered from the
> physics extracted from comp, infinite statistics on infinite
> computations) and this one predict some amount of indeterminacy which
> is or is not covered by quantum computations. This is an open problem
> (*the* open problem, partially solved by the 4th and 5th AUDA-
> hypostases).
>
I understand they have to be recovered from all computations... but
what I'm asking is how a quantum computation could cover more than a
classical one ? it would violate the church-turing thesis.
>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> Stuff and consciousness -
>>>> which I suspect to be a spurious dichotomy - get collapsed into
>>>> this.
>>>> But given self-relativisation in the context of self-access, you can
>>>> follow the math in either 'stuffy' or 'computational' directions
>>>> till
>>>> you get where you need to be, and like others I suspect this will
>>>> play
>>>> out according as we discover the relative derivation of persons <=>
>>>> things. As before, perhaps this is a no-more-neutral-than-necessary
>>>> monism, and I guess it leaves the question of emulation as model or
>>>> reality to be settled empirically.
>>>
>>> With comp, reality is definitely not Turing emulable. If we
>>> discover a
>>> computable theory of reality, then we will know that we cannot say
>>> yes
>>> to the doctor, we will have to abandon the comp hyp.
>>
>> I don't understand this either, if reality is computable, obviously
>> our consciousness is too.
>
> You are right. Reality is turing emulable ====> our consciousness is
> Turing emulable (obvious).
> But we have: our consciousness is Turing emulable ===> physical
> reality is NOT a priori Turing emulable (by UDA-7-8)
>
> From this it follows that: Reality is turing emulable ====> Reality
> is NOT turing emulable.
>
Ok, but if you come up with a computable theory of reality you can't
invoke UDA to disprove it (as UDA would have been disproved from the
fact there is a computable theory of reality). So your objections is
correct only if UDA is true... but if UDA is true, you can't come up
with a computable theory of reality hence you never come to the
contradiction.
So, either there is a computable theory of reality then UDA is false
(not COMP), or UDA is true and there isn't a computable theory of
reality, you can't have both. But you can't use an argument that is
already disproven to disprove the theory.
> This entails that: Reality is NOT turing emulable. With or without comp.
>
> The prospect that reality is described by a quantum computation is not
> yet ruled out, because the non computable part of reality could still
> be only the first person indeterminacy. The non computable feature
> would be the "geographic" one, like finding oneself in Washington
> instead of Moscow after a self-duplication experiment.
>
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
Regards,
Quentin
--
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Received on Fri Aug 14 2009 - 12:58:32 PDT