2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
>
> On 30 Mar 2009, at 17:03, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> 2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
>
>>
>> Hi Kelly, and others,
>>
>> Well, thanks for your report. Did you smoke the extract? It usually
>> last for 4 minutes. It is amazing it did last so long with you, I know
>> only one case of an experience lasting 20 minutes. I am happy you found
>> your experience interesting. You can consult and discuss your
>> experience, and those of others here:
>> http://www.entheogen.com/forum/forumdisplay.php?f=135
>>
>> Now the real question is, does that experience helped in providing, for
>> example, an answer to my last remark to Quentin?
>>
>> I quote the question again. It is important concerning
>> comp-immortality, and eventually how to derive physics from computer
>> science.
>> I do think such a question is difficult, and show the weakness in
>> identifying the self with personal memories, and this justifies the
>> necessity of the AUDA move, I think.
>>
>> Of course, if you enjoy dream-state-like, you can enjoy Salvia without
>> troubling yourself with hard metaphysical questions. Yet I would be
>> interesting if Quentin or Stathis, or anyone, could acknowledge a
>> conceptual difficulty here.
>>
>> <<Hmmm...
>> I ask you, and others, this question. What is the probability "now",
>> that you will find yourself in Washington and Moscow the 24 december
>> 2009, when you are annihilated in Brussels, now, (17 March 2009) and
>> reconstituted in both Moscow and Washington the 18 March 2009, say)?
>> The problem is that the reconstitution machine did dysfunction in
>> Washington, so that, from the 18 March 2009 up to the 20 Augustus 2009
>> you (the you in Washington) suffered a "total amnesia". And then,
>> "you" recovered slowly and progressively from that through adequate
>> medication up to a total recall, the 23 December (and none of yous did
>> move from W or M).
>>
>
> Well I think all of this depends on the fact that your memories "come
> back". If it doesn't then I will not be in washington, cqfd.
>
>
> What if half of your memory come back?
>
Well, it would be a half me continuation... :-)
And in the setup explained here... Plain me continuation would be the one in
Moscow... and Half me would be in washington. If me now could meet both of
me plain and half ... I would certainly identify current me to be plain me.
While I would care for half me, I care less of him than plain me. But if no
memories at all are left I wouldn't identify him as myself like I don't
identify you (nor any future you) as myself.
>
>
>
> What you're talking about salvia (loosing your personnal identity during
> the experience) is only correct because you have memories of it (salvia
> experience) on your current self which knows he is Bruno. If you had no
> memories of it then it makes no sense to say you did loose your "identity".
>
>
> Yes, but retrospectively, I can assert that I remain conscious, despite the
> loss of identity. So, why should we not take such "computational
> ontinuations" into account, in the immortality question, and in the hunt of
> 1-white rabbits? This is certainly not clear for me.
>
>
We should take in account those continuation where the memory loss is
temporary... not the one where I become you. The contrary is like the
believer in reincarnation, if you don't remember your past live then it is
the same as you didn't have any pas live and on a personal and selfish view,
totally useless to the current live. What's the point to survive/reincarnate
if there is nothing left of you.. I don't call that surviving... I don't
care if my body doesn't biologically survive... I care that *I* (my
mind/memories/experiences) survive.
>
>
>
>
> As for conscious dream... I don't think you *do* know you're conscious
> while dreaming, but you do know it after the dreaming experience.
>
>
>
> John Mikes seems to think so too, but here I certainly disagree. Lucid
> dreamer, who are verifiably in the paradoxical state of dream (through EEG)
> , can communicate with the observer in the lab, through eyes moves or
> through extremity of fingers (which are not paralysed).
>
Well do they ? Does the dreamer remember interacting with the observer (the
real one) ? I know that outside sound/temperature/... act on the dream, just
because while dreaming we are never truly and completly disconnected from
the outside... But it says nothing about the consciousness of the dreamer.
The dreamer remember after being awake he was somehow conscious, but was he
really ? I do remember conscious dream (or so I called) still do not really
believe I was in the sense I was now.
> They have made all the usual experience (singing, computing, walking,
> running in the dream) and they have discover it generate the same activity
> in the dream than in the waking life. The experience of Laberge and Dement
> have definitely convinced me that the hypothesis that we are unconscious
> during dream is badly founded.
> Consciousness should not be confused with awakeness.
>
Could you give me some links about those experiences ?
Thank you,
Quentin
--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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Received on Mon Mar 30 2009 - 14:03:58 PDT