Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
> 2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden <mailto:marchal.domain.name.hidden.ac.be>>
>
>
> On 30 Mar 2009, at 17:03, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> 2009/3/30 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden
>> <mailto:marchal.domain.name.hidden>>
>>
>>
>> Hi Kelly, and others,
>>
>> Well, thanks for your report. Did you smoke the extract? It
>> usually
>> last for 4 minutes. It is amazing it did last so long with
>> you, I know
>> only one case of an experience lasting 20 minutes. I am happy
>> you found
>> your experience interesting. You can consult and discuss your
>> experience, and those of others here:
>> http://www.entheogen.com/forum/forumdisplay.php?f=135
>>
>> Now the real question is, does that experience helped in
>> providing, for
>> example, an answer to my last remark to Quentin?
>>
>> I quote the question again. It is important concerning
>> comp-immortality, and eventually how to derive physics from
>> computer
>> science.
>> I do think such a question is difficult, and show the weakness in
>> identifying the self with personal memories, and this
>> justifies the
>> necessity of the AUDA move, I think.
>>
>> Of course, if you enjoy dream-state-like, you can enjoy
>> Salvia without
>> troubling yourself with hard metaphysical questions. Yet I
>> would be
>> interesting if Quentin or Stathis, or anyone, could acknowledge a
>> conceptual difficulty here.
>>
>> <<Hmmm...
>> I ask you, and others, this question. What is the probability
>> "now",
>> that you will find yourself in Washington and Moscow the 24
>> december
>> 2009, when you are annihilated in Brussels, now, (17 March
>> 2009) and
>> reconstituted in both Moscow and Washington the 18 March
>> 2009, say)?
>> The problem is that the reconstitution machine did dysfunction in
>> Washington, so that, from the 18 March 2009 up to the 20
>> Augustus 2009
>> you (the you in Washington) suffered a "total amnesia". And
>> then,
>> "you" recovered slowly and progressively from that through
>> adequate
>> medication up to a total recall, the 23 December (and none of
>> yous did
>> move from W or M).
>>
>>
>> Well I think all of this depends on the fact that your memories
>> "come back". If it doesn't then I will not be in washington, cqfd.
>
> What if half of your memory come back?
>
>
> Well, it would be a half me continuation... :-)
>
> And in the setup explained here... Plain me continuation would be the
> one in Moscow... and Half me would be in washington. If me now could
> meet both of me plain and half ... I would certainly identify current
> me to be plain me. While I would care for half me, I care less of him
> than plain me. But if no memories at all are left I wouldn't identify
> him as myself like I don't identify you (nor any future you) as myself.
>
>
>>
>>
>> What you're talking about salvia (loosing your personnal identity
>> during the experience) is only correct because you have memories
>> of it (salvia experience) on your current self which knows he is
>> Bruno. If you had no memories of it then it makes no sense to say
>> you did loose your "identity".
>
> Yes, but retrospectively, I can assert that I remain conscious,
> despite the loss of identity. So, why should we not take such
> "computational ontinuations" into account, in the immortality
> question, and in the hunt of 1-white rabbits? This is certainly
> not clear for me.
>
>
> We should take in account those continuation where the memory loss is
> temporary... not the one where I become you. The contrary is like the
> believer in reincarnation, if you don't remember your past live then
> it is the same as you didn't have any pas live and on a personal and
> selfish view, totally useless to the current live. What's the point to
> survive/reincarnate if there is nothing left of you.. I don't call
> that surviving... I don't care if my body doesn't biologically
> survive... I care that *I* (my mind/memories/experiences) survive.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>> As for conscious dream... I don't think you *do* know you're
>> conscious while dreaming, but you do know it after the dreaming
>> experience.
>
>
> John Mikes seems to think so too, but here I certainly disagree.
> Lucid dreamer, who are verifiably in the paradoxical state of
> dream (through EEG) , can communicate with the observer in the
> lab, through eyes moves or through extremity of fingers (which are
> not paralysed).
>
>
> Well do they ? Does the dreamer remember interacting with the observer
> (the real one) ? I know that outside sound/temperature/... act on the
> dream, just because while dreaming we are never truly and completly
> disconnected from the outside... But it says nothing about the
> consciousness of the dreamer. The dreamer remember after being awake
> he was somehow conscious, but was he really ? I do remember conscious
> dream (or so I called) still do not really believe I was in the sense
> I was now.
>
>
>
> They have made all the usual experience (singing, computing,
> walking, running in the dream) and they have discover it generate
> the same activity in the dream than in the waking life. The
> experience of Laberge and Dement have definitely convinced me that
> the hypothesis that we are unconscious during dream is badly founded.
> Consciousness should not be confused with awakeness.
>
Of course being asleep, whether dreaming or not, is not being
unconscious. I sleep peacefully through my clock chiming, my wife
getting up and coming back to bed; but I awake instantly if my name is
whispered or there is a strange noise in the kitchen.
Brent
>
> Could you give me some links about those experiences ?
>
> Thank you,
> Quentin
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>
> >
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Received on Mon Mar 30 2009 - 14:50:12 PDT