Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
> 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah <jackmallah.domain.name.hidden <mailto:jackmallah.domain.name.hidden.com>>
>
>
> --- On Mon, 2/9/09, Quentin Anciaux <allcolor.domain.name.hidden
> <mailto:allcolor.domain.name.hidden>> wrote:
> > Also I still don't understand how I could be 30 years old and not
> 4, there are a lot more OM of 4 than 30... it is the argument you
> use for 1000 years old, I don't see why it can hold for 30 ?
>
> Quentin, why would the measure of 4 year olds be "a lot more" than
> the measure of 30 year olds? I have already explained that the
> effect of differentiation (eg by learning) is exactly balanced by
> the increased number of versions to sum over (the N/N explanation)
> and the effect of child mortality is small.
>
>
> I don't get it. Why should the "measure" suddenly decrease at 80 (or
> 100) years old ? Why not 30 ? Why not 4 ?
>
> Also this is still assuming ASSA and does not take in accound that my
> next momemt is not a random momemt (with high measure) against all
> momemts, but a random momemt again all momemts that have my current
> moment as memories/previous. Even if being Napoleon at the age of 30
> would have a measure 10^30 higher than any individual measure of momemts
> that has composed me so far... I'm not Napoleon at age 30, my next
> moment will never be Napoleon at age 30 and never will and that changes
> everything. I know that in 1 minute, it will be 1 minute later from now
> whatever the measure of now and in one minute is.
>
> Also Stathis as a point, you said in the A1/A2 (A) vs B case that A as 2
> times the measure of B... But B will be with probabilty 1... does B feel
> less real ? less conscious (that would contradict the assumption B was a
> conscious moment). If the measure doesn't change anything to these
> attributes... then however small this measure is as long as it is not
> striclty null, the experienced moment will be real... as real as the
> real here and now is.
Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of
consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which
implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the
measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of
consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a
computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't.
Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector
in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it.
Brent Meeker
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Received on Wed Feb 11 2009 - 12:24:49 PST