Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of
> consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which
> implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the
> measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of
> consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a
> computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't.
> Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector
> in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it.
But why should less measure imply a "diminishment of consciousness"? Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish, for example.
Jesse
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Received on Wed Feb 11 2009 - 13:37:34 PST