2009/2/11 Jack Mallah <jackmallah.domain.name.hidden>
>
> --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it
> is still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different
> people who merely experience the illusion of being me.
> > However, this just becomes a semantic exercise. Saying that I will wake
> up in my bed tomorrow is equivalent to saying that someone sufficiently
> similar to me will wake up in my bed tomorrow.
>
> Exactly.
>
> And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is
> equivalent to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as
> compared to the number of people who will wake up in your bed tommorrow.
>
> Which is equivalent to saying that, for all practical purposes, you will
> probably die overnight. And that is the point.
>
>
I don't think so, the point is that there is still someone who will wake up
in the bed tomorrow... as long as the measure is not null this is true, and
that's what count for the argument to be valid.
So what you are saying is that at some point the measure fall to be strictly
null... and that needs an argument from your part.
Also you did not answer the question about the realness feeling of observer
B... he has twice less measure according to you, does it feel less
alive/real/conscious ?
Regards,
Quentin
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--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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Received on Wed Feb 11 2009 - 11:28:34 PST