>
>
>
>
> >From: Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>
> >To: fritzgriffith.domain.name.hidden (Fritz Griffith)
> >CC: R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
> >Subject: Re: Heed Clarification on MW
> >Date: Tue, 14 Dec 1999 10:55:13 +1100 (EST)
> >
> >I'm going to post individual followups to try to straighten out this
> >semantic mess.
> >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > >From: Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>
> > > >To: jqm1584.domain.name.hidden (Jacques M. Mallah)
> > > >CC: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> > > >Subject: Re: Heed Clarification on MW
> > > >Date: Mon, 13 Dec 1999 17:02:59 +1100 (EST)
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > On Wed, 8 Dec 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> > > > > > > In a MW or all-universe model, all your decisions can do is to
> > > >change
> > > > > > > the percentage of people-like-you who do certain things, or
> > > >equivalently
> > > > > > > the percentage of universes in which people-like-you have taken
> > > >various
> > > > > > > actions.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I disagree with this statement strongly. The evolution of the MW
> >model
> > > > > > is completely deterministic, and the ratios of measures of
> >different
> > > > > > worlds is completely determined at the start.
> > > > >
> > > > > I discussed this one, decision theory in the MWI, with Wei Dai
> > > > > pretty thoroughly a while ago; look it up.
> > > > > Basically, your decisions *do* still determine the outcome, just
> > > > > like in a single-universe deterministic model. Which is the same as
> > > > > saying that the laws of physics + initial conditions determine the
> > > > > outcome; just another way of talking about the same thing, as you
> >are
> > > >not
> > > > > something outside of physics.
> > > >
> > > >According to your following paragraph, we don't have free will, so
> > > >therefore there are no decisions we can make to affect the evolution
> > > >of the state function. You contradict yourself!
> > > >
> > >
> > > I think what Jacques is saying makes sense. He's saying that we don't
> >have
> > > free will because everything we decide is completely determined by the
> >same
> > > laws of physics as everything else. However, since our decisions still
> >do
> > > happen, they affect the evolution of things that happen around us. For
> > > example, if I decide to drop a glass cup, the decision to do that would
> > > occur due to the laws of physics, and not because of free will. But
> > > dropping that glass cup would cause it to shatter on the ground. So,
> >your
> > > deterministic decisions have an effect on the state function.
> > >
> >
> >I know this point of view, however it is completely wrong. QM is a
> >deterministic theory, and will precisely give the evolution of a state
> >function over time. This state function description is a 3rd person
> >decsription. QM can also make probabilistic predictions about what an
> >observer will see in the 1st person picture. It is not deterministic
> >from the 1st person viewpoint. From my 1st person perspective, I have
> >the freedom to chose whether to drop a cup or not. From the 3rd person
> >perspective, there are multiple branchings, with different measures,
> >in some of which I have chosen to drop the cup and others in which I
> >haven't. You may wish to call it "the illusion of free will" (at least
> >then you are acknowledging the phenomenon of free will, even if as
> >an illusion), however for me the term "illusion" in this context
> >conveys no semantic content whatsoever. My views are explained as above,
> >and I
> >don't believe there is any inconsistency with it.
>
> What you say makes sense, except it doesn't imply free will. If the 1st
> person perspective is probabalistic, then each decision you make could be
> said to be determined by probability. For example, I may have a much higher
> probability of deciding not to drop the cup than to drop it. But assuming
> that we do not know the probability, then no matter what our final decision,
> that decision will probably be the most probable decision, simply by the
> very fact that we made that decision. And, as I said before, our most
> probable decisions are those that are sensible, which is why we experience
> free will.
Nothing implies free will. Free will is an "empirical" phenomenon
needing explanation, or at least reconciliation with whatever else we
know about the world.
I agree with the rest of the paragraph.
>
> >
> >
> > > > >
> > > > > > What your free will does is affect the likelihood of what branch
> >your
> > > > > > 1st person experience will take. Free will is a 1st person
> >phenomenon,
> > > > > > not a 3rd person phenomenon.
> > > > >
> > > > > There is no free will; in fact, as I say above, realizing that
> > > > > solves the problem. As for "1st person" you will not be surprised
> >that
> > > >I
> > > > > see no basis for such distinctions.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >This is rubbish. There is free will. For example I can choose to look
> > > >at a photon using a left circularly polarised filter or a right
> > > >circularly polarised filter. The physics fills in what I see from some
> > > >probability distribution based on the state function.
> > > >
> > > >Now however you choose to explain this, it is a phenomenon of free
> > > >will.
> > > >
> > >
> > > No matter what you call it, I believe that our decisions are still
> > > deterministic. The illusion of free will occurs because the more
> >sensible
> > > decisions are of higher probability, according to QM. No, this cannot
> >be
> > > proven, but you seem to believe that our decisions are *not*
> >deterministic,
> > > and this cannot be proven either. But it seems more sensible to me to
> > > assume that our decisions follow the laws that everything else does.
> > >
> >
> >Our decision are not deterministic _because_ they are a 1st person
> >phenomenon. From a 1st person perspective, the world is not
> >deterministic. Only when the full multiverse is taken into account, is
> >determinism recoverd.
> >
> > > >How I chose to explain this is that free will is a 1st person
> > > >phenomenon, and doesn't exist at all in the 3rd person world. An
> > > >analogy here is that centrifugal force exists in a rotating frame of
> > > >reference, but not a static one. It is a mistake to say that
> > > >centrifugal force therefore does not exist (as I've heard certain high
> > > >school teacher assert).
> > >
> > > I don't really see how this analogy has any relevance to our discussion.
> > >
> >
> >Only because some people would say that you are experiencing the
> >"illusion" of centrifugal force when you are sitting in a centrifuge.
> >
> >
> > > While we're on this topic, I'd like a little clarification on something.
> > > All of this discussion is assuming that only worlds branching off of our
> > > world are possible.
> >
> >Who assumed that?
> >
> >But from a 3rd-person perspective, aren't they ALL
> > > possible, but some just not possible for us (from a 1st-person
> >perspective)?
> > > Looking at it from a 3rd-person point of view, the decision not to
> >commit
> > > quantum suicide because you'd leave loved ones behind doesn't hold
> >anymore.
> > > Sure, you'd leave loved ones behind, but if you decided not to do it,
> >there
> > > would still be another world where you decided to do it, and left loved
> >ones
> > > behind. So it makes no difference either way.
> >
> >Exactly. However, there is another good reason why one shouldn't
> >commit "quantum" suicide, and that is it is very hard to control low
> >probabilty outcomes - most likely you will end up spending the rest of
> >your days severely handicapped, which if QTI is right, is for a _very_
> >long time!
>
> Yes, that is certainly a good reason not to commit suicide.
>
> I have just come up with a thought: if the theory of immortality is correct,
> then as our lifespan approaches infinity, the probability of us getting
> injury to the brain to the point where we are barely an SAS anymore
> approaches 1. In other words, we are all destined to end up as vegetables
> who can barely think for all of eternity. Is that a depressing thought or
> what?
>
It certainly is depressing. The only glimmer of hope is that medical
technology might improve correspondingly so that such brain injuries
are repairable (Bruno's artificial brain transplants perhaps?).
Cheers
> >
> >
> > >
> > > >
> > > > > - - - - - - -
> > > > > Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
> > > > > Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
> > > > > "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
> > > > > My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > >Dr. Russell Standish Director
> > > >High Performance Computing Support Unit,
> > > >University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
> > > >Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
> > > >Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
> > > >Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> > >
> > >----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > >
> > >
> > > ______________________________________________________
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> > >
> >
> >
> >
> >----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >Dr. Russell Standish Director
> >High Performance Computing Support Unit,
> >University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
> >Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
> >Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
> >Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> >----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> ______________________________________________________
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>
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Received on Mon Dec 13 1999 - 19:06:44 PST