>From: Fred Chen <flipsu5.domain.name.hidden>
>To: Fritz Griffith <fritzgriffith.domain.name.hidden>
>CC: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
>Subject: Re: Heed Clarification on MW
>Date: Mon, 13 Dec 1999 20:56:39 -0800>
>
>
>Fritz Griffith wrote:
>
> > >From: Fred Chen <flipsu5.domain.name.hidden>
> > >To: Fritz Griffith <fritzgriffith.domain.name.hidden>
> > >CC: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> > >Subject: Re: Heed Clarification on MW
> > >Date: Mon, 13 Dec 1999 02:28:04 -0800
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >Fritz Griffith wrote:
> > >
> > > > >From: Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>
> > > > >To: jqm1584.domain.name.hidden (Jacques M. Mallah)
> > > > >CC: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> > > > >Subject: Re: Heed Clarification on MW
> > > > >Date: Mon, 13 Dec 1999 17:02:59 +1100 (EST)
> > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Wed, 8 Dec 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> > > > > > > > In a MW or all-universe model, all your decisions can do is
>to
> > > > >change
> > > > > > > > the percentage of people-like-you who do certain things, or
> > > > >equivalently
> > > > > > > > the percentage of universes in which people-like-you have
>taken
> > > > >various
> > > > > > > > actions.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I disagree with this statement strongly. The evolution of the
>MW
> > >model
> > > > > > > is completely deterministic, and the ratios of measures of
> > >different
> > > > > > > worlds is completely determined at the start.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I discussed this one, decision theory in the MWI, with Wei
>Dai
> > > > > > pretty thoroughly a while ago; look it up.
> > > > > > Basically, your decisions *do* still determine the outcome,
>just
> > > > > > like in a single-universe deterministic model. Which is the
>same as
> > > > > > saying that the laws of physics + initial conditions determine
>the
> > > > > > outcome; just another way of talking about the same thing, as
>you
> > >are
> > > > >not
> > > > > > something outside of physics.
> > > > >
> > > > >According to your following paragraph, we don't have free will, so
> > > > >therefore there are no decisions we can make to affect the
>evolution
> > > > >of the state function. You contradict yourself!
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > I think what Jacques is saying makes sense. He's saying that we
>don't
> > >have
> > > > free will because everything we decide is completely determined by
>the
> > >same
> > > > laws of physics as everything else. However, since our decisions
>still
> > >do
> > > > happen, they affect the evolution of things that happen around us.
>For
> > > > example, if I decide to drop a glass cup, the decision to do that
>would
> > > > occur due to the laws of physics, and not because of free will.
> > >
> > >If you decide to drop the cup you satisfy the laws of physics. If you
> > >decide
> > >notto drop the cup, you satisfy the laws of physics. If the laws of
>physics
> > >didn't allow
> > >more than one outcome, how can you talk about splitting?
> >
> > >From a 1st-person point of view, no splitting does occur. We only view
>one
> > world. Splitting only occurs from a 3rd-person point of view, where we
>see
> > that in one world we dropped the cup and in the other we didn't.
>
>Ok, so we can agree the laws of physics are 3rd person and free will is 1st
>person,
>
>conforming to these laws?
>
Sounds right.
> > >
> > > > But
> > > > dropping that glass cup would cause it to shatter on the ground.
>So,
> > >your
> > > > deterministic decisions have an effect on the state function.
> > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > What your free will does is affect the likelihood of what
>branch
> > >your
> > > > > > > 1st person experience will take. Free will is a 1st person
> > >phenomenon,
> > > > > > > not a 3rd person phenomenon.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > There is no free will; in fact, as I say above, realizing
>that
> > > > > > solves the problem. As for "1st person" you will not be
>surprised
> > >that
> > > > >I
> > > > > > see no basis for such distinctions.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >This is rubbish. There is free will. For example I can choose to
>look
> > > > >at a photon using a left circularly polarised filter or a right
> > > > >circularly polarised filter. The physics fills in what I see from
>some
> > > > >probability distribution based on the state function.
> > > > >
> > > > >Now however you choose to explain this, it is a phenomenon of free
> > > > >will.
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > No matter what you call it, I believe that our decisions are still
> > > > deterministic. The illusion of free will occurs because the more
> > >sensible
> > > > decisions are of higher probability, according to QM. No, this
>cannot
> > >be
> > > > proven, but you seem to believe that our decisions are *not*
> > >deterministic,
> > > > and this cannot be proven either. But it seems more sensible to me
>to
> > > > assume that our decisions follow the laws that everything else does.
> > >
> > >Our decisions are subject to the same laws. I don't know what prior you
> > >woulduse
> > >to determine the probabilities of your decision, but it would seem to
>vary
> > >from
> > >person to person.
> > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > >How I chose to explain this is that free will is a 1st person
> > > > >phenomenon, and doesn't exist at all in the 3rd person world. An
> > > > >analogy here is that centrifugal force exists in a rotating frame
>of
> > > > >reference, but not a static one. It is a mistake to say that
> > > > >centrifugal force therefore does not exist (as I've heard certain
>high
> > > > >school teacher assert).
> > > >
> > > > I don't really see how this analogy has any relevance to our
>discussion.
> > > >
> > > > While we're on this topic, I'd like a little clarification on
>something.
> > > > All of this discussion is assuming that only worlds branching off of
>our
> > > > world are possible. But from a 3rd-person perspective, aren't they
>ALL
> > > > possible, but some just not possible for us (from a 1st-person
> > >perspective)?
> > > > Looking at it from a 3rd-person point of view, the decision not to
> > >commit
> > > > quantum suicide because you'd leave loved ones behind doesn't hold
> > >anymore.
> > > > Sure, you'd leave loved ones behind, but if you decided not to do
>it,
> > >there
> > > > would still be another world where you decided to do it, and left
>loved
> > >ones
> > > > behind. So it makes no difference either way.
> > > >
> > >
> > >You brought this up before. I didn't quite understand earlier, but now
>it
> > >seemsclearer in this context. If you have two logically incompatible
> > >worlds,
> > >you can't hold both to be true, from a 1st person perspective. From a
>3rd
> > >person
> > >perspective, S and ~S are both true; everything would be true. So this
> > >perspective
> > >is not helpful for decisions (which are 1st person actions anyway).
> > >
> > >Fred
> >
> > ok... so it would be correct to view this as saying that if you decide
>to
> > commit quantum suicide, then because your decisions are determined by
> > probability laws (non free-will view), the very fact that you decided to
> > commit quantum suicide means that the probability of deciding to do it
>is
> > probably greater than the probability of deciding not to. So deciding
>not
> > to commit quantum suicide is effectively 'giving' that decision a higher
> > measure than the opposite decision. Would this be correct?
>
>Well, this raises 2 issues for me.
>
>First, how do we determine the a priori, 3rd person probability of making
>one
>decision or another?
>Do we count universes or measure the ratio of universes where one decision
>occurs
>vs. to those
>where the opposite decision occurs? Do we make use of the person's history
>and
>statistics from similar
>cases? Why would those similar cases apply to the person's individual case?
I would imagine that we could theoretically learn every variable that
affects our decisions, but our brains are so complex that I would imagine
that there would be a lot more variables than we could ever expect. I would
also imagine that our brain is a very chaotic system, so that a hardly
significant difference of initial states would result in a totally different
outcome. But if we were to learn every variable that controlled our
decisions, and monitor those variables perfectly, then we should be able to
give probabilities to our decisions.
This leads to an interesting problem, though: if we knew the probability of
our decisions, we should be able to act against those probabilities, and
make a decision that is very unlikely. We could effectively choose to be in
either a low measure world or a high measure world.
>
>Second, even when we have a (3rd person) probability, is the more probable
>outcome
>the one that is
>observed in the first person? Sometimes we are surprised by a shocking
>suicide,
>because
>"we would never have known" that that would have happened. So in this
>case, our
>3rd person priors
>were wrong. Once the decision has been made, we can adjust our priors to
>reflect a
>higher
>probability of making that decision. However, in the case of suicide, this
>would be
>pathetically
>late.
>
>Fred
>
I think that in some cases, we are surprised because we don't know all the
variables. Check out my next post for an idea I had from these thoughts.
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > - - - - - - -
> > > > > > Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
> > > > > > Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
> > > > > > "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
> > > > > > My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > >Dr. Russell Standish Director
> > > > >High Performance Computing Support Unit,
> > > > >University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
> > > > >Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
> > > > >Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
> > > > >Room 2075, Red Centre
> > >http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> > > >
> > >
> >----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > > >
> > > >
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> > >
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Received on Tue Dec 14 1999 - 09:33:43 PST