>From: Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>
>To: fritzgriffith.domain.name.hidden (Fritz Griffith)
>CC: R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
>Subject: Re: Heed Clarification on MW
>Date: Tue, 14 Dec 1999 10:55:13 +1100 (EST)
>
>I'm going to post individual followups to try to straighten out this
>semantic mess.
>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > >From: Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>
> > >To: jqm1584.domain.name.hidden (Jacques M. Mallah)
> > >CC: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> > >Subject: Re: Heed Clarification on MW
> > >Date: Mon, 13 Dec 1999 17:02:59 +1100 (EST)
> > >
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, 8 Dec 1999, Russell Standish wrote:
> > > > > > In a MW or all-universe model, all your decisions can do is to
> > >change
> > > > > > the percentage of people-like-you who do certain things, or
> > >equivalently
> > > > > > the percentage of universes in which people-like-you have taken
> > >various
> > > > > > actions.
> > > > >
> > > > > I disagree with this statement strongly. The evolution of the MW
>model
> > > > > is completely deterministic, and the ratios of measures of
>different
> > > > > worlds is completely determined at the start.
> > > >
> > > > I discussed this one, decision theory in the MWI, with Wei Dai
> > > > pretty thoroughly a while ago; look it up.
> > > > Basically, your decisions *do* still determine the outcome, just
> > > > like in a single-universe deterministic model. Which is the same as
> > > > saying that the laws of physics + initial conditions determine the
> > > > outcome; just another way of talking about the same thing, as you
>are
> > >not
> > > > something outside of physics.
> > >
> > >According to your following paragraph, we don't have free will, so
> > >therefore there are no decisions we can make to affect the evolution
> > >of the state function. You contradict yourself!
> > >
> >
> > I think what Jacques is saying makes sense. He's saying that we don't
>have
> > free will because everything we decide is completely determined by the
>same
> > laws of physics as everything else. However, since our decisions still
>do
> > happen, they affect the evolution of things that happen around us. For
> > example, if I decide to drop a glass cup, the decision to do that would
> > occur due to the laws of physics, and not because of free will. But
> > dropping that glass cup would cause it to shatter on the ground. So,
>your
> > deterministic decisions have an effect on the state function.
> >
>
>I know this point of view, however it is completely wrong. QM is a
>deterministic theory, and will precisely give the evolution of a state
>function over time. This state function description is a 3rd person
>decsription. QM can also make probabilistic predictions about what an
>observer will see in the 1st person picture. It is not deterministic
>from the 1st person viewpoint. From my 1st person perspective, I have
>the freedom to chose whether to drop a cup or not. From the 3rd person
>perspective, there are multiple branchings, with different measures,
>in some of which I have chosen to drop the cup and others in which I
>haven't. You may wish to call it "the illusion of free will" (at least
>then you are acknowledging the phenomenon of free will, even if as
>an illusion), however for me the term "illusion" in this context
>conveys no semantic content whatsoever. My views are explained as above,
>and I
>don't believe there is any inconsistency with it.
What you say makes sense, except it doesn't imply free will. If the 1st
person perspective is probabalistic, then each decision you make could be
said to be determined by probability. For example, I may have a much higher
probability of deciding not to drop the cup than to drop it. But assuming
that we do not know the probability, then no matter what our final decision,
that decision will probably be the most probable decision, simply by the
very fact that we made that decision. And, as I said before, our most
probable decisions are those that are sensible, which is why we experience
free will.
>
>
> > > >
> > > > > What your free will does is affect the likelihood of what branch
>your
> > > > > 1st person experience will take. Free will is a 1st person
>phenomenon,
> > > > > not a 3rd person phenomenon.
> > > >
> > > > There is no free will; in fact, as I say above, realizing that
> > > > solves the problem. As for "1st person" you will not be surprised
>that
> > >I
> > > > see no basis for such distinctions.
> > > >
> > >
> > >This is rubbish. There is free will. For example I can choose to look
> > >at a photon using a left circularly polarised filter or a right
> > >circularly polarised filter. The physics fills in what I see from some
> > >probability distribution based on the state function.
> > >
> > >Now however you choose to explain this, it is a phenomenon of free
> > >will.
> > >
> >
> > No matter what you call it, I believe that our decisions are still
> > deterministic. The illusion of free will occurs because the more
>sensible
> > decisions are of higher probability, according to QM. No, this cannot
>be
> > proven, but you seem to believe that our decisions are *not*
>deterministic,
> > and this cannot be proven either. But it seems more sensible to me to
> > assume that our decisions follow the laws that everything else does.
> >
>
>Our decision are not deterministic _because_ they are a 1st person
>phenomenon. From a 1st person perspective, the world is not
>deterministic. Only when the full multiverse is taken into account, is
>determinism recoverd.
>
> > >How I chose to explain this is that free will is a 1st person
> > >phenomenon, and doesn't exist at all in the 3rd person world. An
> > >analogy here is that centrifugal force exists in a rotating frame of
> > >reference, but not a static one. It is a mistake to say that
> > >centrifugal force therefore does not exist (as I've heard certain high
> > >school teacher assert).
> >
> > I don't really see how this analogy has any relevance to our discussion.
> >
>
>Only because some people would say that you are experiencing the
>"illusion" of centrifugal force when you are sitting in a centrifuge.
>
>
> > While we're on this topic, I'd like a little clarification on something.
> > All of this discussion is assuming that only worlds branching off of our
> > world are possible.
>
>Who assumed that?
>
>But from a 3rd-person perspective, aren't they ALL
> > possible, but some just not possible for us (from a 1st-person
>perspective)?
> > Looking at it from a 3rd-person point of view, the decision not to
>commit
> > quantum suicide because you'd leave loved ones behind doesn't hold
>anymore.
> > Sure, you'd leave loved ones behind, but if you decided not to do it,
>there
> > would still be another world where you decided to do it, and left loved
>ones
> > behind. So it makes no difference either way.
>
>Exactly. However, there is another good reason why one shouldn't
>commit "quantum" suicide, and that is it is very hard to control low
>probabilty outcomes - most likely you will end up spending the rest of
>your days severely handicapped, which if QTI is right, is for a _very_
>long time!
Yes, that is certainly a good reason not to commit suicide.
I have just come up with a thought: if the theory of immortality is correct,
then as our lifespan approaches infinity, the probability of us getting
injury to the brain to the point where we are barely an SAS anymore
approaches 1. In other words, we are all destined to end up as vegetables
who can barely think for all of eternity. Is that a depressing thought or
what?
>
>
> >
> > >
> > > > - - - - - - -
> > > > Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
> > > > Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
> > > > "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
> > > > My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> >----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >Dr. Russell Standish Director
> > >High Performance Computing Support Unit,
> > >University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
> > >Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
> > >Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
> > >Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> >
> >----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > >
> >
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>
>
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Dr. Russell Standish Director
>High Performance Computing Support Unit,
>University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
>Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
>Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
>Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Received on Mon Dec 13 1999 - 18:52:35 PST