>
>
> I'm new in town, and it's a delight to follow your discussions!
>
> On free will:
>
> I'm inclined to doubt that free will as usually conceived is a coherent
> idea. On the one hand, 'freedom', as a property pertaining to alterations
> of mental states, connotes a mysterious suspension of causal influence from
> the rest of the world. On the other hand, however, few would accept an
> analysis in terms of _randomly_ engendered alterations.
>
Putting in the idea of downward causation is assuming something about
how free will might work, so I'd be reluctant to assume this from the
outset. All I mean by free will is that _I_ am able to make
decisions. This is a phenomenon of the 1st person, and one that can be
explained in a number of ways. One way is to say that this phenomenon
is an illusion, however that answer is too glib for me. I have stated
my own view on this, which is heavily influenced by Deutsch, so I
won't repeat it here.
> It is perhaps more instructive to understand free will in terms of
> downwards causation. Mental states are higher-level features of certain
> machines such as brains, by (very rough) analogy with liquidity being a
> higher-lever feature of H2O molecules in motion. Some of these states have
> in turn a causal impact on
> constitutive elements on the lower level (e.g. neuronal firing patterns).
> This dwe might think of as "free will". On this analysis, the distinction
> between the 1. and 3. person perspectives is purely epistemic: The
> panscient spectator would have no use for it.
>
The panscient spectator is probably a logical impossibility :)
However, if you mean an observer would have trouble observing free
will in other individuals, you are probably right. Any degree of free
will or conciousness is extrapolated on other beings by means of
anthropomorphism.
> But I fail to see any special connection between free will, however
> understood, and the multiversum models - pace e.g. Deutsch in "Fabric of
> Reality". Maybe a multiversum view is required for a coherent analysis of
> counterfactuals, hence of causality, and hence of downwards causation; but
> that's a much more general matter.
>
> Best,
> --
> Gisle Tangenes
>
The special connection relates to reconciling determinism and free
will. Free will is of course completely possible in a
non-deterministic single universe.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Received on Mon Dec 13 1999 - 17:40:04 PST