Hi Gunther,
On Wed, May 7, 2008 at 2:12 PM, Günther Greindl
<guenther.greindl.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> Galen Strawson, 'Realistic monism: why physicalism entails
> panpsychism' 2006
> http://web.gc.cuny.edu/philosophy/people/strawson/rmwpep.pdf
>
The author admits himself that his doctrine is more a form of
experential/non-experiential-ist (thus dualist) doctrine. It seems to
me the usual dual naturalism. I can agree with the idea that
"consciousness" is physical, but not as an explanation of
consciousness, still less of course as an explanation of what is
matter. It is exactly like Searle, but with "physical" in place of
biological.
Let me know if you understand that computationalism is just
incompatible with that sort of move. Comp reduces completely the mind
body problem into a necessary derivation of body-matter from a
number/mind theory (like computer science, provablity logic +
intensional variants, etc.).
With comp, and a bit poetically, the physical is the border of
computer's computer science (the border of computer science as seen by
computers).
But I have not yet finished Strawson's paper. Up to now, I appreciate
it because it is quite clear (and thus clearly unconvincing with
respect to the comp hyp).
Thanks for the reference. Best,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Thu May 15 2008 - 09:24:14 PDT