Re: UDA paper

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Fri, 22 Feb 2008 15:32:28 +0100

Hi Mirek,

Le 20-févr.-08, à 16:24, Mirek Dobsicek a écrit :

> yes, I am now a bit busy. Lecturing, seminars,.. wedding planning :-)

Waouh! Congratulation! I'm happy for you.

> I am somewhere in the middle your paper. Regarding the very point of
> the
> described 1-indeterminancy, I have no problem there at all. Anyone who
> ever called a fork() unix function (read, cut, duplicate) followed by
> an
> execve(read-destination-name-from-keyboard()) function, should not have
> a problem here. A program, even with considerably good self-referential
> skills, has no chance to know whether I will enter Warsaw or Moscow on
> the keyboard.

Nice to hear that.

> As I have said, I have not finished reading the paper yet. But sometime
> I have a problem with a bit of feeling of circularity of arguments, or
> described in better words, given assumptions A={..}, conjectures
> B={...}
> are true, where Bs feels like rephrased As, and therefore Bs are
> trivially true. No disrespect here!

Not at all. I appreciate. Sometimes I have to explain lengthily that my
contribution is modest (even if a bit radical).
And not so original if you take into account that the comp-like
(platonist) conception of reality has been defended by many greek
intellectuals during a millenium, before being banished or murdered
like Hypatia.

> It just how do I feel now. Bs are overwhelming, but As are pretty
> strong
> assumptions,

Well, at the same time, not so much. Most scientist believe (not always
consciously) in comp, and at the same time in some notion of *primary*
or *primitive* matter. They feel dizzy when they begin to understand
the incompatibility between comp and (weak) materialism. Sometimes comp
or mechanist philosophy is used by materialist to put the mind/body
problem under the rug, which explains why they dislike my work.
Sometimes it is even just political: they believe I am attacking Marx
or Lenine ...
The main contribution I have done (I think) is in the illustration that
by making comp sufficiently precise, some of the weirder aspect are
testable. Here the results shock many people among those who does not
know the current "interpretation" problem of QM. When I talked on
many-worlds in the seventies, it was enough to be put in the crackpot
category. I am sure many on the list have lived similar things.

> so Bs are not surprising anymore, yet an hour later Bs are
> overwhelming again.

Yes it is like that. Few people realise that comp *is* a very strong
assumption, even just Church thesis is already very strong, and has
many counter-intuitive consequences. This is not very well know too.

> Best,
> Mirek

I wish you the best to you and to your girlfriend. She is lucky, you
look serious. I hope your (future) wife will not trow the books she
offered to you through the windows, like it happened to a friend of
mine (and she threw the computer with!). I reassure you: I think that
was exceptional! Presently I am not so lucky because I have been break
in yesterday, and my home computer has been stolen with all the
attached devices including the main backup disk. I will have to rewrite
hundreds of unfinished papers... . Sorry to bother you with that,

Have a super nice wedding, and take all the time you need to read the
few papers I have finished,


> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Hi Mirek,
>> I guess you are busy.
>> I would just like to insist that when I say (14-febr.-08):
>>> Please note that the 1-indeterminacy I am talking about in the third
>>> step is really a pure classical indeterminacy. It arises from the
>>> fact
>>> that my classical state is duplicable, and then I cannot predict
>>> which
>>> *experience* I will *feel* after a self-duplication: mainly
>>> Washington
>>> OR Moscow (or Sidney *or* Beijing), ...
>> This is really a key point, if not *the* key point. I think it is
>> almost trivial, but sometimes some people have a problem with this. In
>> that case it helps to imagine the same experiment done with some
>> inference inductive machine in place of a human or "you", and this in
>> an iterated self-duplication. In that case the result amount to saying
>> that no robot, when duplicated iteratively (in Washington and Moscow,
>> say) can predict its future sequence of results of first person
>> self-localization. This becomes equivalent with the fact that most
>> finite bit-strings, like WMMMWWMWWWM ... are not compressible.
>> Someone told me (out-of-line) that he *can* predict with certainty his
>> future in that situation: for example he can predict WWWWWWWWW..., but
>> this means he is not taking into account the saying of the other
>> reconstituted people, which, *assuming comp* are genuine "descendant"
>> of the "original". Those people will acknowledge that their
>> "prediction
>> with certainty" was false, and they have the same right and reason to
>> be taken seriously, again when we *assume* the comp hypothesis.
>> Have you a problem with this? I think most on this list grasp this
>> point, but don't hesitate to tell me if you don't. Without a clear
>> understanding of what happens here we can't really proceed ... (nor
>> can
>> we grasp Everett formulation of QM I could argue ...).
>> Bruno
> >

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Received on Fri Feb 22 2008 - 09:32:56 PST

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