Re: UDA revisited

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2006 13:29:54 +0100

Le 21-nov.-06, à 22:58, Russell Standish a écrit :
> Fair enough. I was just meaning that one cannot 1-tell as you put
> it. I agree that it may be possible to empirically distinguish between
> living in a UD and not in a UD, although that remains to be seen.
OK. Note that I have predicted the many-worlds appearance from comp,
including the comp-suicide, well before knowing the quantum and the
quantum MW. From an intuitive point of view the UDA explains also why
to expect some classical tautologies to be "physically" wrong, that is,
the UDA already justifies some form of non locality ("spatial" and
"temporal") for probabilities mainly due to the impossibility for any
digital machine to be aware of the delay a UD would introduce between
generation of successive steps in the running of all programs.
Now, with the AUDA, we have precise quantitative propositions to test.
We know that nature's observables violate the classical tautology
(p & q) -> ((p & r) v (q & ~r))
What remains to be seen is that the comp-nature violate it too, that is
that at least S4Grz1, or Z1*, or X1* does not prove the "quantized"
version of the Bell inequality (p, q represents the sigma_1 sentences
in the arithmetic translation, B = box, D = diamond):
BD [(BD p & BD q) -> (BD ((BD p) & (BD r)) v (BD q & BD(~(BD r)))]
using the Goldblatt (cf also Rawling and Selesnick) quantization rule T:
T(p) = BD p (p atomic)
T(A & B) = T(A) & T(B)
T(~A) = BD(~T(A))
Now, in "BD p" the box and the diamond are of course the one of the
third fourth and five hypostases (the soul, intelligible matter, and
sensible matter) so here the B<something> is really defined recursively
by B <something> & D <something> (and more complex if some modality
appears in the "something"). Just to say that when you translate the
modal Bell inequality into the logic G*, and then G, you get a huge
proposition, and although both G and G* are decidable, that Bell
inequality remains intractable.
In another post you say:
> What Bruno is now calling the 3rd person point of view I label 1st
> person plural. Bruno is now distinguishing several different types of
> 1st
> person plural viewpoints.
> I believe I took an accurate snapshot of the terminological usage at
> the time I wrote the book, but terminology in this field does have a
> habit of moving on (and so it should).
I don't think I have ever change the nomenclature. (my fault if I have
not been enough clear). Although G is the logic of self-reference I
take care making precise that it is a third person self-reference, like
when you talk on your brain/body/universe with your doctor. What is new
(since my thesis defense) is that, since I have (re)read Plotinus (and
get more scholar confirmations of my reading), I am willing to call
0-person point of view the notion of (arithmetical) truth. It helps to
fit the whole lobian interview in the (neo)platonist paradigm. By
Tarski theorem (the non definability by M of the full notion of truth
about M), the 0-person view is akin to the quasi-impersonal unnameable
ONE of Plotinus.
Such a notion of truth is not normative. If it is true that the machine
M will stay a billion years in some purgatory, then the proposition
asserting this will be correct theology. Purely theological
propositions, belonging to G* minus G, are not knowable in general, but
may be, correctly sometimes, "bettable" and some of them empirically
falsifiable, or first (plural) personally confirmable (like the
In yet another post you say:
> When talking about minds, the self/other boundary need not occur on
> the biological boundary (skin). I would say that when dreaming, or
> hallucinating, the random firing we perceive as coming from our input
> centres (visual cortex for instance) is coming from outside our minds
> (although still within our heads).
I can accept this. It is consistent with the idea that the UD is not
conscious, despite generating all possible form of (comp)
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Received on Wed Nov 22 2006 - 07:30:34 PST

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