Re: UDA revisited

From: Colin Geoffrey Hales <>
Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2006 07:36:45 +1100 (EST)

Bruno wrote:

> In yet another post you say:
>> When talking about minds, the self/other boundary need not occur on the
biological boundary (skin). I would say that when dreaming, or
hallucinating, the random firing we perceive as coming from our input
centres (visual cortex for instance) is coming from outside our minds
(although still within our heads).
> I can accept this. It is consistent with the idea that the UD is not
conscious, despite generating all possible form of (comp)
> consciousness.
> Bruno

Thinking out loud here.

Yeah, this is how I am coming to view COMP. The logic and analysis
involved means you can step back, point at certain aspects of the analysis
it provides and say... <this> corresponds to aspect X of 'reality', <that>
correponds to aspect Y of reality... and so forth. It's a sort of
generalised abstracting framework within which forms or classes of
knowledge are exhibited.

These categorisations can be seen in the abstract realm of number is one
thing. What does this say about a non-abstract/real realm of STUFF i.e.
one constructed of something else? A lot.

I suppose I'm grappling with the idea that COMP is true...but it's true in
it's own realm. The realm of STUFF has a complete set of equivalent
truths. We discuss/contrast/compare the two realms. But that's where it
ends. the sense that the UD made of STUFF does not implement everything
that 'being' STUFF has in the STUFF realm. Conversely in the UD number
realm, a UD made of number but computing in STUFF-as-number would not have
everything that the STUFF realm has.

So in this context the idea that COMP is declared right or wrong (proven)
in the STUFF realm is meaningless. Likewise the proof 'STUFF-HYPOTHESIS'
in the number realm would be meaningless. ?

So it's like there's only ever useful correspondence between realms, not
any sort of literal equivalence. This is how COMP can be true (in the
number realm) and yet false in our STUFF realm. False in the sense that a
STUFF-UD computing number will not be conscious in our realm in the same
way that a NUMBER-UD computing STUFF would not be conscious in the number

Am I making sense? It seems plausible. If so it means that those things
depicted using COMP are true, but computationalism put as the expectation
of computer science, is false. In the number realm there would be
number-computer science beings able to make the equivalent statement that
'stuffialisationism' is false.

This just came out of my head.....

BTW has anyone made any sense of my appedices yet?



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Received on Wed Nov 22 2006 - 15:37:20 PST

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