Re: UDA revisited

From: Russell Standish <lists.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2006 18:40:38 +1100

On Mon, Nov 20, 2006 at 06:16:29PM +1100, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
>
> <snip>
> > I have never heard of your "virtual theorems" before
>
> I sent an early version of it to you over a year ago.

I never claimed to have understood everything you've sent me. Also,
I don't think you used the term virtual theorem - I certainly can't
recall the term.

>
> > , but assuming
> > they're analogous to the implied computations that occur in your CA
> > example, the difference would be the other way around. A UD will
> > actually compute all these implied computations, whereas they are only
> > virtual with respect to a direct computation.
>
> I must be missing something. Perhaps it's a subtly to so with assumptions
> about what constitutes computation. The point is that 'computing' it using
> an abstraction in the UD kills any 'what it is like'. The virtual theorems
> = virtual matter are gone, along with the matter. It will only ever be
> like a UDA piece of hardware to be a UDA, because it's not doing the
> computation with that IS 'the stuff'.
>

Then all I can say is that I do not know what you mean by virtual
theorems. I was responding more to your CA example which you used to
try an illustrate your concept, and commenting that the implied
computations between cells further apart that the update neighbourhood
radius are actually performed by the UD, because the UD is performing
all computations, that is what it does.

It is entirely possible that your CA analogy was inappropriate, of course.

> I am not convinced at all that the UDA has anything other than 'as-if'
> constructs, none of which have any real experiential qualities whatever.
> Today I proved mathematically that zombies cannot do science. The capacity
> to do science is the key to it. The UDA cannot do science (is a zombie).

Firstly UDA is the UD Argument of Bruno's. I assume you just mean UD,
and your little pinky slips in the extra A out of habit.

Secondly, zombies technically are meant to indistinguishable from
conscious beings. So cognitive scientists would be most surprised to
hear that you've proved zombies cannot do science, since we've
immediately found an external characteristic distinguishing some
conscious beings (ie scientists) from zombies.

Of course I suspect you have a different definition of zombie...

Thirdly, nobody has ever said UD's are conscious. If computationalism
is true, then they are executing conscious programs, but they're not
conscious themselves.

>
> I'll cogitate and see if I can work out another way of approaching the issue.
>
> cheers
> colin hales
>

Cheers

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A/Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
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Received on Mon Nov 20 2006 - 02:41:04 PST

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