RE: UDA revisited

From: Stathis Papaioannou <stathispapaioannou.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2006 21:21:08 +1100

Colin Hales writes:
> I am not convinced at all that the UDA has anything other than 'as-if'
> constructs, none of which have any real experiential qualities whatever.
> Today I proved mathematically that zombies cannot do science. The capacity
> to do science is the key to it. The UDA cannot do science (is a zombie).
>
> I'll cogitate and see if I can work out another way of approaching the issue.
I know you have discussed these matters many times, including in the draft of your
paper on solipsism which you recently sent me, but it may help if you could answer
some specific questions:
(a) is it possible for a digital computer to be conscious?
(b) is it possible for an electronic or mechanical device to be conscious?
(c) could you describe some minimally complex scientific work which a (not so bright)
human scientist could do but a zombie scientist could not?
(d) how is a zombie scientist's treatment of the natural world different to a human
scientist's, given that all either has to go on is sensory feeds and information
processing?
(e) if you take technology as an end result of scientific thinking, how do you explain the
existence of very elaborate biological machines resulting from mindless evolutionary
processes?
Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Mon Nov 20 2006 - 05:21:24 PST

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