Le 23-oct.-06, à 00:12, 1Z a écrit :
> Huh? Computationalism is no more able to account for
> qualia than physicalism.
Computationalism (the standard one) through my work (don't hesitate to
criticize it) gives a precise account of qualia.
It is even a refutable theory of both quanta and qualia, given that
quanta are shown to be sharable qualia (first person plural).
If the comp quanta behavior are shown to contradict empirical quanta,
then that would refute the comp theory of of both qualia and quanta,
and actually this would refute comp, even acomp (comp without "yes
doctor").
Contrarywise, everyone a bit serious in philosophy of mind agrees that
physicalist theories have not yet succeed in just approaching or
formulating the the qualia problem.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Thu Oct 26 2006 - 06:40:38 PDT