David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > Maybe physics is relations all the way down.
>
> Hmm... I think this is pretty close to what Bruno is saying, using
> AR+CT+UDA as the 'placeholder' for the universe of relational
> possibility. But, to differentiate your own views, what would you
> propose as the relata (i.e. when you've gone 'all the way down')?
Primary matter of course.
> > They are very different, and a lot of the work is done
> > by the Platonic assumption.
>
> Good, we seem to agree that the conclusions of comp1 and comp2 are
> different. And specifically the question of recursive priority - what
> emerges from what - is hardly a trivial difference. Bruno has argued,
> if I've got it right, that
his version of
> comp supports 1-->3 over 3-->1 (3 = 'the
> relata'). Do you have a knock-down argument to the contrary, other than
> a philosophical commitment to the priority of what can be 'seen' (as
> opposed to, as Colin would no doubt say, *that* it can be seen)?
I have several arguments. Principally against Platonism, without
which he does not obtain his UD without building it.
(I have noticed that you seem to equate a relation-only
universe with Platonia. But the point about Platonia is
is that there is no contingency there. A relation-only
universe can still be a contingent universe, in which
a UD fails to exist for some contingent reason).
> BTW, I'm not arguing from the perspective of a 'convert' to comp,
> merely as an interested seeker. However, like Colin, I don't feel that
> physics as normally practised takes seriously enough the *fact* of
> there being an observation (as opposed to the *effect* of an
> observational process).
Surely that is a psychological question.
> When considered at all, it's as a putative
> 'relational side effect' of the physics (e.g. standard
> computationalism).
PhysicalISM requires one to believe that.
But physicalism isn't physics -- it is a metaphysical claim.
> So part of my interest in comp is motivated by the
> fact that it treats this aspect of 'everything' with maximum
> seriousness, explicitly seeking a theory that elucidates the structure
> of 'observation' equally with that of the 'observables' thus revealed.
Huh? Computationalism is no more able to account for
qualia than physicalism.
> Consequently, it may be of value to put final judgement on what sort of
> state-of-affairs could support 'RITSIAR' on hold, pending an
> exploration of these very interesting implications of comp.
If a computation is only a subset of, or abstraction from,
a physical process (as in non-Bruno computationalism),
how can it explain things physics can't?
> David
>
> > David Nyman wrote:
> > > 1Z wrote:
> > >
> > > > > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on
> > > > > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues),
> > > > > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is
> > > > > concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque
> > > > > as to its roots in 'physical causality'.
> > > >
> > > > No, not entirely opaque.
> > >
> > > Could you illuminate?
> >
> > Maybe physics is relations all the way down.
> >
> > > > Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not
> > > > the conclusion.
> > >
> > > Yes indeed, but the conclusions (e.g. the explanatory direction of
> > > 3-person <--> 1-person) are surely somewhat different?
> >
> > They are very different, and a lot of the work is done
> > by the Platonic assumption.
> >
> > > David
> > >
> > >
> > > > David Nyman wrote:
> > > > > 1Z wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between
> > > > > > computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing
> > > > > > and highly significant.
> > > > >
> > > > > It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have
> > > > > remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical.
> > > > >
> > > > > > A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism
> > > > > > is much less so.
> > > > >
> > > > > Must I assume that by 'Platonism' here you mean COMP?
> > > >
> > > > Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)
> > > >
> > > > > We do need, I
> > > > > think, to make a clear distinction in these discussions between
> > > > >
> > > > > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on
> > > > > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues),
> > > > > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is
> > > > > concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely opaque
> > > > > as to its roots in 'physical causality'.
> > > >
> > > > No, not entirely opaque.
> > > >
> > > > > and
> > > > >
> > > > > 2) COMP - a theory which posits the emergence of 'matter' as a measure
> > > > > on a computationally prior 1-person level - hence defining its
> > > > > axiomatic base solely in terms of computational fundamentals - CT, AR,
> > > > > etc.
> > > >
> > > > Bruno uses 'comp' to mean the 'axiomatic base', not
> > > > the conclusion.
> > > >
> > > > > David
> > > > >
> > > > > > David Nyman wrote:
> > > > > > > Brent Meeker wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the only way to > judge whether it is a good model to see how it corresponds with "mere appearance"; just > like we test QM, general relativity, and every other theory. It *might* be the really real > model - but so might any other model that fits all the data.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Yes, of course, Brent - hence my comments later on in my post. But in
> > > > > > > fact, comp implies that the normal physics model can't 'fit all the
> > > > > > > data', if we include (as we must) the 1-person pov itself in 'the
> > > > > > > data'.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between
> > > > > > computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing
> > > > > > and highly significant. A conflict between physicalsim and Platonism
> > > > > > is much less so.
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Received on Sun Oct 22 2006 - 18:13:09 PDT