Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience being one at
> a time.
Stathis, I concur with this view, and for the reasons you give.
However, much as I hate to complicate this issue further, I wonder if
you have a view on the following. I mentioned to Peter the issue of the
destructive effect of loss of short-term memory on the coherence of
'normal' conscious processes - e.g. forgetting the beginning of a
sentence before getting to the end of it - an affliction to which I'm
not entirely a stranger myself! From this, it seems to me that the
notion of a 'state of consciousness' as being discrete with an OM, or
'time-capsule', might be overly simplistic, unless we conceive of the
necessary extent of memory as being entirely encoded in, and accessible
to, an individual OM - i.e. an OM can represent a 'fully-conscious
individual'. For that matter, what temporal duration is an OM supposed
to encompass - a 'Planck-length' instant; the entire 'specious present?
This whole issue seems to be under-defined, but the danger is that the
very notion of 'the present' might need to be treated as an emergent
from a coordinated ensemble, rather than being inherent in individual
OMs. But then what would coordinate them?
Any thoughts?
David
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > > > I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a virtual
> > > > > reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, for the sake
> > > > > of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your conscious
> > > > > experience do not need to be explicitly linked together to "flow" and they do
> > > > > not need to be explicitly separated, either in separate universes or in separate
> > > > > rooms, to be separate.
> > > >
> > > > I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
> > > > reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all
> > > > mathematical
> > > > structures are exemplified, the structure corresponging to (me up till
> > > > 1 second ago)
> > > > + (purple dragons) must exist. If there is nothing
> > > > mathematical to keep out of HP universe, the fact that I have never
> > > > seen one is
> > > > evidence against a mathematical multiverse.
> > >
> > > That you don't experience HP universes is as much an argument against a physical
> > > multiverse as it is an argument against a mathematical multiverse.
> >
> > Not "as much". It depends on how constrained they are.
> > Physical multiverses can be almost as constrained as single universes,
> > or almost as unconstrained as multiverses.
> >
> > > If a physical MV
> > > exists, then in some branch you will encounter purple dragons in the next second.
> >
> > With a very low measure.
> >
> > > The fact that you don't means that either there is no physical multiverse or there is
> > > a physical multiverse but the purple dragon experience is of low measure. Similarly in
> > > a mathematical multiverse the HP experiences may be of low measure.
> >
> > Physical multiversalists can choose measure to match observation (that
> > is
> > basically how the SWE is arrived at). Mathematical multiversalists
> > cannot choose an arbitrary measure, because nothing is arbitrary or
> > contingnet
> > in Platonia. Measure has to emerge naturally and necessarily for them.
>
> OK, if you put constraints on a physical multiverse so that it's smaller than "every possible
> universe".
>
> > > > > If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> > > > > moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the
> > > > > future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the future.
> > > >
> > > > That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP
> > > > universe. But I never do.
> > >
> > > Not "just as easily". If you are destructively scanned and a moment from now 2 copies
> > > of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a 2/3 chance
> > > of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in Washington.
> >
> > What's that got to do with Platonia? Platonia contains every
> > configuration of matter.
> > (Snd no time). Configurations where I'm in Moscow, configurations where
> > I'm in Washington,
> > configurations where I'm on the moon, configurations where I'm in
> > Narnia.
> > There is no unaccountable fact to the effect that there is 1 copy of me
> > in Moscow,
> > 2 in Washington, and 0 on the moon. There are no random gaps in
> > Platonia.
> >
> > (That's the "mathematical* mutiverse of course. A physical mutliverse
> > is an entirely different matter).
>
> Suppose God took Platonia, in all its richness, and made it physical. What would expect to
> experience in the next moment?
>
> (a) nothing
> (b) everything
> (c) something
>
> (a) can't be right. Although in the vast majority of universes in the next moment your head
> explodes or the laws of physics change such that your brain stops working (sorry), as long as
> there is at least one copy of you still conscious, you can expect to remain conscious.
>
> (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience being one at
> a time. Even if one of the copies is mind-melded with others, that still counts as an individual
> with more complex experiences. Moreover, it is doubtful whether an experience of everything
> simultaneously - every possible thought, including all the incoherent ones - is different to no
> experience at all, much as a page covered in ink contains no more information than a blank
> page.
>
> Therefore, (c) must be right. You can expect to experience something. What is it that you
> might experience, if all possibilities are actualised? What will you experience if no measure is
> defined, or all the possibilities have equal measure?
>
> > > It is a
> > > real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be experienced than the
> > > orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of some of the
> > > debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a mathematical as opposed
> > > to a physical multiverse.
> >
> > Not at all. P-multiversalists can and do choose measure to match
> > observation.
> >
> > > > > But if you had the successive moments of your consciousness implemented
> > > > > in parallel, perhaps as a simulation on a powerful computer, it would be impossible
> > > > > to tell that this was the case. For all you are aware, there may not *be* any past
> > > > > moments: your present experience may include false memories of your past, and
> > > > > whole world may have been created a second ago.
> > > >
> > > > A simulation running on a computer is still a dynamic, temporal
> > > > process. The point is that the passage of
> > > > time tells me that I am not in Platonia.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Time Capsules: Getting Flow from Sequence.
> > > >
> > > > Proponents of the Block Universe view believe that there is only a
> > > > B-Series. Some think that alone is adequate to explain the subjective
> > > > Flow-of-Time. It is easy enough to see how there could be a sequence in
> > > > the B series. If we consider a series of 3 dimensional "snapshots" of
> > > > someone's brain, each subsequent snapshot iwll contain information
> > > > relating back to previous ones.
> > > > But is this chain or sequence enough to establish flow ? A B-series
> > > > without an A-series is like a spatial series. If you had a series of
> > > > clones arranged spatially so that clone 2 has all of clone 1's memories
> > > > (and more), clone 3 has all of clone 2's memories (and more) and so on,
> > > > you would not expect anything to be flowing from one clone to another.
> > > > The clones form a series of "time capsules", and a such they have a
> > > > natural sequence, but that is all.
> > > > Without an A series, there is nothing to justify the idea that only one
> > > > time capsule is conscious "at a time". Either they all are, or none
> > > > are. We know we are conscious, so we must reject the "none are" option.
> > > > The Block Universe therefore predicts that all time capsules are
> > > > conscious. This is in line with the way the Block Universe spatialises
> > > > Time. It predicts that consciousness is a single 4-dimensional entity.
> > > > I would not just be conscious now with memories of the past, I would
> > > > have a consciousness in the past overlaid on my present consciousness.
> > >
> > > Whether the Block Universe model is right or not, the series of clones you
> > > describe, set up as an experiment, would still give the experience of being
> > > continuously conscious through time.
> >
> > The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem
> > is that they would all be conscious simultaneously.
>
> Sure, objectively you could say they are all conscious simultaneously, but if you
> asked any of them, how do you think they would describe their subjective experience?
>
> > > I remember being conscious a second
> > > ago but how could I possibly know that I didn't just pop into existence
> > > complete with false memories half a second ago?
> >
> > That isn't the problem. The problem is that if time is just like
> > space, as the BU theory states, you should have single consciousness
> > spread across time, not a temporal sequence of one-at-a-time
> > conscious states.
>
> I don't understand that last statement. How, exactly, would my conscious experience
> be any different in a BU? What evidence from my experience is there that I am not now
> living in a BU?
>
> > > All I know is what I am
> > > experiencing *now*.
> >
> > Yes. That is the phenomenological fact that contradicts the BU.
> >
> > > It is only because I have memories and a sense of being
> > > the same person over time that I consider it was "I" who woke up this morning
> > > and it will be "I" again who goes to bed tonight. I don't have a direct telepathic
> > > link to past or future selves, or copies in the next room, to ensure that they are
> > > "really me". All I have to go on are my present memories and beliefs, which could
> > > in theory be artificially implanted without changing anything about my stream of
> > > consciousness. Nothing is changed if we say that we live only transiently, and the
> > > feeling that we persist as individuals through time is an illusion.
>
>
> How does that phenomenological fact contradict the BU? It seems to me that it supports it.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Thu Oct 26 2006 - 06:33:26 PDT