Peter Jones writes:
> > > > I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a virtual
> > > > reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, for the sake
> > > > of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your conscious
> > > > experience do not need to be explicitly linked together to "flow" and they do
> > > > not need to be explicitly separated, either in separate universes or in separate
> > > > rooms, to be separate.
> > >
> > > I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
> > > reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all
> > > mathematical
> > > structures are exemplified, the structure corresponging to (me up till
> > > 1 second ago)
> > > + (purple dragons) must exist. If there is nothing
> > > mathematical to keep out of HP universe, the fact that I have never
> > > seen one is
> > > evidence against a mathematical multiverse.
> >
> > That you don't experience HP universes is as much an argument against a physical
> > multiverse as it is an argument against a mathematical multiverse.
>
> Not "as much". It depends on how constrained they are.
> Physical multiverses can be almost as constrained as single universes,
> or almost as unconstrained as multiverses.
>
> > If a physical MV
> > exists, then in some branch you will encounter purple dragons in the next second.
>
> With a very low measure.
>
> > The fact that you don't means that either there is no physical multiverse or there is
> > a physical multiverse but the purple dragon experience is of low measure. Similarly in
> > a mathematical multiverse the HP experiences may be of low measure.
>
> Physical multiversalists can choose measure to match observation (that
> is
> basically how the SWE is arrived at). Mathematical multiversalists
> cannot choose an arbitrary measure, because nothing is arbitrary or
> contingnet
> in Platonia. Measure has to emerge naturally and necessarily for them.
OK, if you put constraints on a physical multiverse so that it's smaller than "every possible
universe".
> > > > If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> > > > moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the
> > > > future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the future.
> > >
> > > That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP
> > > universe. But I never do.
> >
> > Not "just as easily". If you are destructively scanned and a moment from now 2 copies
> > of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a 2/3 chance
> > of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in Washington.
>
> What's that got to do with Platonia? Platonia contains every
> configuration of matter.
> (Snd no time). Configurations where I'm in Moscow, configurations where
> I'm in Washington,
> configurations where I'm on the moon, configurations where I'm in
> Narnia.
> There is no unaccountable fact to the effect that there is 1 copy of me
> in Moscow,
> 2 in Washington, and 0 on the moon. There are no random gaps in
> Platonia.
>
> (That's the "mathematical* mutiverse of course. A physical mutliverse
> is an entirely different matter).
Suppose God took Platonia, in all its richness, and made it physical. What would expect to
experience in the next moment?
(a) nothing
(b) everything
(c) something
(a) can't be right. Although in the vast majority of universes in the next moment your head
explodes or the laws of physics change such that your brain stops working (sorry), as long as
there is at least one copy of you still conscious, you can expect to remain conscious.
(b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience being one at
a time. Even if one of the copies is mind-melded with others, that still counts as an individual
with more complex experiences. Moreover, it is doubtful whether an experience of everything
simultaneously - every possible thought, including all the incoherent ones - is different to no
experience at all, much as a page covered in ink contains no more information than a blank
page.
Therefore, (c) must be right. You can expect to experience something. What is it that you
might experience, if all possibilities are actualised? What will you experience if no measure is
defined, or all the possibilities have equal measure?
> > It is a
> > real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be experienced than the
> > orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of some of the
> > debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a mathematical as opposed
> > to a physical multiverse.
>
> Not at all. P-multiversalists can and do choose measure to match
> observation.
>
> > > > But if you had the successive moments of your consciousness implemented
> > > > in parallel, perhaps as a simulation on a powerful computer, it would be impossible
> > > > to tell that this was the case. For all you are aware, there may not *be* any past
> > > > moments: your present experience may include false memories of your past, and
> > > > whole world may have been created a second ago.
> > >
> > > A simulation running on a computer is still a dynamic, temporal
> > > process. The point is that the passage of
> > > time tells me that I am not in Platonia.
> > >
> > >
> > > Time Capsules: Getting Flow from Sequence.
> > >
> > > Proponents of the Block Universe view believe that there is only a
> > > B-Series. Some think that alone is adequate to explain the subjective
> > > Flow-of-Time. It is easy enough to see how there could be a sequence in
> > > the B series. If we consider a series of 3 dimensional "snapshots" of
> > > someone's brain, each subsequent snapshot iwll contain information
> > > relating back to previous ones.
> > > But is this chain or sequence enough to establish flow ? A B-series
> > > without an A-series is like a spatial series. If you had a series of
> > > clones arranged spatially so that clone 2 has all of clone 1's memories
> > > (and more), clone 3 has all of clone 2's memories (and more) and so on,
> > > you would not expect anything to be flowing from one clone to another.
> > > The clones form a series of "time capsules", and a such they have a
> > > natural sequence, but that is all.
> > > Without an A series, there is nothing to justify the idea that only one
> > > time capsule is conscious "at a time". Either they all are, or none
> > > are. We know we are conscious, so we must reject the "none are" option.
> > > The Block Universe therefore predicts that all time capsules are
> > > conscious. This is in line with the way the Block Universe spatialises
> > > Time. It predicts that consciousness is a single 4-dimensional entity.
> > > I would not just be conscious now with memories of the past, I would
> > > have a consciousness in the past overlaid on my present consciousness.
> >
> > Whether the Block Universe model is right or not, the series of clones you
> > describe, set up as an experiment, would still give the experience of being
> > continuously conscious through time.
>
> The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem
> is that they would all be conscious simultaneously.
Sure, objectively you could say they are all conscious simultaneously, but if you
asked any of them, how do you think they would describe their subjective experience?
> > I remember being conscious a second
> > ago but how could I possibly know that I didn't just pop into existence
> > complete with false memories half a second ago?
>
> That isn't the problem. The problem is that if time is just like
> space, as the BU theory states, you should have single consciousness
> spread across time, not a temporal sequence of one-at-a-time
> conscious states.
I don't understand that last statement. How, exactly, would my conscious experience
be any different in a BU? What evidence from my experience is there that I am not now
living in a BU?
> > All I know is what I am
> > experiencing *now*.
>
> Yes. That is the phenomenological fact that contradicts the BU.
>
> > It is only because I have memories and a sense of being
> > the same person over time that I consider it was "I" who woke up this morning
> > and it will be "I" again who goes to bed tonight. I don't have a direct telepathic
> > link to past or future selves, or copies in the next room, to ensure that they are
> > "really me". All I have to go on are my present memories and beliefs, which could
> > in theory be artificially implanted without changing anything about my stream of
> > consciousness. Nothing is changed if we say that we live only transiently, and the
> > feeling that we persist as individuals through time is an illusion.
How does that phenomenological fact contradict the BU? It seems to me that it supports it.
Stathis Papaioannou
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Received on Thu Oct 26 2006 - 00:05:47 PDT